Combat Psychology: Learning to Kill in the U.S. Military, 1947-2012 by McKinnie, Patrick
Winthrop University
Digital Commons @ Winthrop
University
Graduate Theses The Graduate School
12-2016
Combat Psychology: Learning to Kill in the U.S.
Military, 1947-2012
Patrick McKinnie
Winthrop University, patrick.mckinnie@yahoo.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.winthrop.edu/graduatetheses
Part of the Military History Commons, and the Psychology Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the The Graduate School at Digital Commons @ Winthrop University. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Graduate Theses by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Winthrop University. For more information, please contact
bramed@winthrop.edu.
Recommended Citation
McKinnie, Patrick, "Combat Psychology: Learning to Kill in the U.S. Military, 1947-2012" (2016). Graduate Theses. 44.
https://digitalcommons.winthrop.edu/graduatetheses/44
 
 
 
COMBAT PSYCHOLOGY: LEARNING TO KILL IN THE U.S. MILITARY, 1947-2012 
 
 
A Thesis  
Presented to the Faculty  
Of the  
College of Arts and Sciences  
In Partial Fulfillment  
Of the Requirements for the Degree  
Of Master of Arts 
In History  
Winthrop University 
 
 
 
December 2016 
 
By 
  
Patrick M. McKinnie 
 
ii 
 
Abstract 
 
In his 1947 work Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command, 
historian S. L. A. Marshall convinced the U.S. government and military of the critical 
need for improved techniques in combat psychology.  However, his more 
fundamental assertion that soldiers needed to be trained to overcome an innate 
psychological resistance to killing would prompt some in the military as well as 
scholars and medical experts to examine the heart and mind of the soldier in combat.  
As a result, an emergent science called killology became a critical component in the 
U.S. military’s quest to better train soldiers for the rigors of combat. This thesis will 
explore the development of sophisticated technology and training techniques used by 
the U.S. military to create soldiers that were more efficient at killing in combat.   
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Introduction 
 
As a young boy I was fascinated by the momentousness of war and the 
profound impact it has had on the course of history. At that time my perception of 
warfare was one of awe: I was fascinated by the resplendent heraldry of medieval 
knights, the aesthetic symmetry found in the Napoleonic Era line of battle, and the 
élan demonstrated by both the North and South during the American Civil War.  As I 
grew older and more thoughtful, my fascination with human conflict took an entirely 
different path; I no longer viewed war through the lens of childhood naiveté.  Instead, 
I became infatuated with the titanic scale and dizzying cost of industrialized total war.  
Leo Tolstoy most succinctly summarized my thoughts on this when he wrote, “War 
has always interested me; not war in the sense of maneuvers devised by great generals 
. . . but the reality of war, the actual killing. I was more interested to know in what 
way and under the influence of what feelings one soldier kills another than to know 
how the armies were arranged at Austerlitz and Borodino.”  While I have come to 
appreciate the science of war, it was while I was researching the Eastern Front during 
World War II, that I began to fixate on how it must have been for the men of the 
doomed German 6th Army at Stalingrad in 1943.  Close to a million men knew that 
misery and death was all that awaited them as the Red Army completed an 
encirclement of the city.  However, in order to help myself wrestle with the 
magnitude of this tragedy, I needed to narrow my focus on the smallest basic unit of 
warfare – the individual soldier.  This thesis examines the historical origins of 
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killology, its essential components, and its influence on the techniques currently used 
by the U.S. military to train men and women to overcome their natural aversion to 
killing.  In a broader context, I examine combat psychology in the U.S. military and 
the myriad improvements in training programs, technology, and tactical organization 
of combat units that produce more lethal soldiers.   
How does the U.S. combat soldier overcome the innate human discomfort 
towards violence, especially the kind of violence experienced during war?  How does 
the same soldier perform once engaged in combat?  What are the environmental, 
psychological, and technological factors that determine how this soldier will perform 
in a fight?  What emotions does the soldier experience before, during, and after the 
battle?  These are just a few of the questions that prompted my investigation into the 
various methods used by the U.S. military to train troops for battle. After starting my 
research into military training, I began encountering references in the literature to a 
new discipline that was being adopted by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps in an 
effort to make killing easier.     
Killology, a term coined by scholar David Grossman, is described as the study 
of the psychological and physiological effects of killing and combat on the human 
psyche.  Though scholars and medical doctors have examined this subject since 
antiquity, in recent decades the U.S. military has made a concerted effort to research, 
design, and apply training programs with the objective of helping soldiers overcome 
the psychological constraints associated with killing.  A newspaper article from 2006, 
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titled “The Science of Creating Killers: Human Reluctance to Take a Life Can be 
Reversed Through Training in the Method Known as Killology,” caught my attention, 
and I began to explore the subject.  I wanted to know the impact of psychological 
conditioning on U.S. soldiers, and how this is achieved.  In most cases I examine the 
U.S. Army specifically, though the United States Marine Corps and Air Force are also 
discussed.   
Chapter One identifies the problem; an unduly large proportion of soldiers in 
World War II were not firing their weapons at the enemy.  While Marshall was 
assigned to the European and Pacific Theaters during World War II he observed 
many instances in which U.S. infantry and Marines failed to take part in combat.  
This was not due to cowardice, as he initially suspected; rather, deep psychological 
factors influenced the soldiers’ refusal to perform their duty in combat.  Marshall 
called this the “ratio of fire,” and he determined only around 15% of soldiers in direct 
combat fire their weapons at the enemy.  During World War II he helped record and 
improve training methods, and he is widely credited with making debriefings 
commonplace throughout the U.S. armed forces. His work with the U.S. military 
continued after World War II and took him to both Korea and Vietnam.  Marshall’s 
research methods have been criticized in recent years; yet despite this, his influence 
on the development of combat psychology and enhanced fighting techniques is 
indisputable. 
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The second chapter examines Marshall’s observations in Korea and the major 
reforms in the U.S. military that came as a reaction to the Cold War and shifting 
strategic defense obligations.  The conflict in Korea pushed the U.S. Army to 
modernize; the result was significant structural changes to unit composition. The 
changes in unit structure in combination with technological advances in weaponry 
resulted in an improved ratio of fire.  Some tentative steps toward enhanced 
psychological conditioning of troops also began in Korea, though nothing like that 
which occurred during the Vietnam Era.  
Chapter Three follows Marshall to Vietnam, where he determined that 
enhanced training techniques in combination with improved fighting doctrine created 
a ratio of fire around 90%.  An examination of the changes in training and technology 
during the Vietnam War revealed a startling finding.  Though rates of fire had been 
significantly improved, what was the psychological cost?  As it turns out, it was 
significant.  The average human can be conditioned to kill, and in some cases may 
take some satisfaction in the act, but there is almost always a risk of significant 
psychological trauma.  The consequences of operant conditioning without adequate 
post-event treatment created a generation of emotionally wounded veterans. 
Finally, Chapter Four looks at the many ways the U.S. military integrated 
concepts based in killology with the modern training regimen of combat troops.  On 
July 12, 2016, a pair of Apache attack helicopters killed a group of Iraqis, including 
two combat journalists.  The incident may have remained hidden were it not for a 
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WikiLeaks release of a videotape of the event stored in the Apache’s onboard 
computer.  As horrific as the results of the attack were, the incident illustrated the 
power of technology in combination with psychological enablers that allowed people 
to kill in such a remorseless manner.  A breakdown of combat psychology in action is 
followed by an examination of government documents that indicate killology had a 
significant influence on the development of modern military training.  Lastly, I 
examine how unmanned vehicles and computer technology are transforming the 
nature of combat training and warfare. The potential psychological consequences of 
the use of drone and video game technology to train America’s military is not yet 
entirely understood.  However, the lethal results achieved by the use of this emergent 
technology for combat is indisputable. 
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Chapter One 
 
 
World War II and the Ratio of Fire 
 
War has always interested me; not war in the sense of maneuvers devised by great 
generals . . . but the reality of war, the actual killing. I was more interested to know in 
what way and under the influence of what feelings one soldier kills another than to 
know how the armies were arranged at Austerlitz and Borodino. 
 
—Leo Tolstoy 
 
 
“Who was the first man to fire at an enemy during the advance?” the bulldog-
like lieutenant colonel asked the assembled men of Company B of the 184th Infantry 
Regiment who had gathered around a makeshift blackboard on the small Pacific atoll 
of Kwajalein.  Acclimated to the oppressive tropical heat that had been a constant 
companion since the beginning of the Gilbert and Marshall Islands campaign in 
November of 1943, these veterans of the hellish fighting against the Japanese Empire 
were engrossed in the conversation.  They listened and responded to the questions 
posed by the colonel and his assistants, despite some of them being injured.1   
A handful of men pointed to the individual responsible for opening fire.  
Obliged to stand up, he recounted his actions before his comrades who occasionally 
would add a corrective piece of information to the story. Furiously scribbling notes 
into a weather-beaten notebook the colonel conducting the investigation, Samuel 
                                                 
1 Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall, Island Victory: The Battle of Kwajalein Atoll (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 2001), 2. 
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Lyman Atwood Marshall, or “SLAM” Marshall as he was fond of  calling himself, 
was capturing the man’s story as part of his official duty as an officer in the recently 
established U.S. Historical Division of the General Staff.     
“How much fire was coming against you at this time?” Marshall asked.  A 
dozen or so men raised their hands to address the question.  Lieutenant Allen E. 
Butler spoke up and identified the real tactical problem he noticed concerning the 
engagement in question “the two platoons, which were supposed to stay close abreast 
as they drove forward in the battle, split away from each other because of the 
ground.”2   
Then Klatt and Kaplan, the lieutenants of the offending platoons, each 
recounted their own version of the situation.  It became apparent that neither had a 
clear understanding of how the engagement was unfolding and ultimately their lack of 
coup d’oeil led to unnecessary casualties.3  The consequences of the fog of war, 
Clausewitz’s term for uncertainty in combat, prompted Marshall to later write 
“Commanders of units do not—cannot—see the whole action.”  As banal as this 
statement may seem today, in 1943 the U.S. armed forces were just emerging as a 
professional army, and by revisiting practical lessons about battle tactics, Marshall 
hoped to save American lives. 
                                                 
2 Ibid,. 5. 
3 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (London: N. Trubner, 1873), 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1946/1946-h/1946-h.htm. ii 25, 58-59.  
8 
 
The severely wounded company commander captain Charles A. White made 
it a point to sit in on this after-battle review hoping to make sense of the previous 
day’s action.  Marshall asked the captain “Were the tanks with you?”  He answered; 
“No, they didn’t get up in time and we jumped off on time without them.  I don’t 
know why they failed us.”4  Again, scribbling in his notebook, Marshall concluded 
that this was a question that needed to be answered by battalion headquarters and the 
armor commanders. This back and forth continued until the battery of questions 
Marshall asked were answered to his satisfaction. 
Two important discoveries made by Marshall and his team during their time 
with the 7th Infantry Division in the Marshall and Gilbert Island campaigns resulted in 
new possibilities for research in both academic and military circles.  First was the 
conceptualization and implementation of after action report (AAR).  The second, 
predicated upon information discovered during AARs, was the ratio-of-fire theory 
central to modern combat psychology.   
Unbelievably, when the U.S. entered the Second World War in 1941, military 
theorists and tacticians had overlooked the immense value of a structured debriefing 
that allowed combatants to analyze, synthesize, and learn from the group’s combined 
experience in battle.  Marshall identified this shortcoming in military procedure as a 
missed opportunity to gather useful data about the nature of fighting in the Pacific and 
later in Europe.  Through trial and error, he refined the group interview process 
                                                 
4 Marshall, Island Victory, 5. 
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further as he searched for more productive methods of teasing information out 
participants.5  His genius was that he oriented this process towards dealing with the 
special kind of hell an infantryman experienced in combat.  As the men took turns 
relating their thoughts and experiences, Marshall recorded their insights.  He later 
them into compiled into a database of oral history from that he used to identify which 
tactics were being successfully used by combat infantry and which were useless.   
Prior to Marshall’s arrival at Kwajalein, aviators of the U.S. Army Air Force 
had been using a somewhat similar procedure for debriefing airmen following a 
bombing run or fighter patrol, though the reason for this was fundamentally different 
than Marshall’s sessions with the infantry.  With the fliers, post-mission round-ups 
were oriented towards gathering the quantitative results of a bombing run or 
analyzing new intelligence from reconnaissance patrol missions.  They were not 
designed to explicitly seek understanding of the mental rigors of battle the airmen 
faced and were in many cases solely concerned with metrics.  This was because the 
needs of the different branches of service differed significantly.   
The mental and emotional toll of killing with bombs or wing-mounted guns 
was arguably a less visceral horror than U.S. combat infantrymen were likely to 
encounter.6  The emotional and psychological differences between fighting in the air 
or on the ground determined the nature and value of the AAR to those who 
                                                 
5 Frederic Smoler, “The Secret Of The Soldiers Who Didn’t Shoot,” American Heritage 40, no. 2 
(1989): 1-3. 
6 David Grossman, On Killing:The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (New 
York: Back Bay Books, 1995),  97-98. 
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participated. The infantry at Makin or Kwajalein appeared especially to appreciate 
Marshall’s system for its mixture of tactical review and therapeutic catharsis.  The 
AAR’s organized and refined by Marshall were officially adopted by the U.S. 
military in phases throughout the 1950s.7  Today the AAR is a debriefing technique 
used by all first-rate militaries around the globe and is considered indispensable as a 
tool for training the next generation of servicemen and women. 
The second discovery made by Marshall concerned the individual soldier’s 
experience in combat and was a direct result of the insight he had gained from the 
group interviews he recorded.  In his most widely debated work, Men Against Fire: 
The Problem of Battle Command in Future War, Marshall put forth his most 
controversial and commonly cited observation: most soldiers in combat did not want 
to kill. As one might expect, this counterintuitive statement captured the attention of 
the military establishment.  The investigation of this claim led to a reevaluation of 
U.S. infantry doctrine and combat training, but not before raising a host of new 
questions by psychologists, sociologists, and military historians looking to further 
understand how soldiers can be trained to kill more efficiently while at war.8  
Marshall inadvertently stumbled upon a fundamental question about the 
psychological capacity of humans to kill one another in combat.   
                                                 
7 F. D. G. Williams and Susan Canedy, SLAM : The Influence of S.L.A. Marshall on the United States 
Army (Ft. Monroe: Office of the Command Historian, 1990), 69. 
8 Paul Fussell, Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), 7-9. 
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This sacrosanct topic, long considered taboo and unsuitable for general 
consumption, is at the heart of recent scholarship in the field of killology, or the study 
of killing as defined by its founder Lieutenant Colonel David Grossman.  Grossman is 
a former professor of Psychology at West Point and is considered a foremost expert 
on human aggression and killing.  He is currently directing The Warrior Science 
Group, an organization dedicated to researching violent crime, and the psychological 
cost of killing. 
When Marshall and his associates recorded the personal experiences of men in 
battle they unwittingly created a database of narratives that have become integral to 
the work of scholars like Grossman. Perhaps more significant than the data they 
collected, their interviews pierced the veil of secrecy surrounding what is for many 
soldiers their most intimate experience in war—killing.  This work examines the 
development of combat psychology in the U.S. military since World War II. This will 
include an examination of the works of S.L.A. Marshall, the ratio-of-fire, killology, 
emergent technology, and training doctrines used presently and in the past. By 
compiling and analyzing research directly associated with this subject, ideally this 
thesis will in some small measure contribute to further understanding of this 
uncomfortable and therefore often neglected topic.   
 
 
Killing 
 
…there man's courage is best decided, where the man who is a coward and 
the brave man show themselves clearly: the skin of the coward changes colour one 
12 
 
way and another, and the heart inside him has no control to make him sit steady, but 
he shifts his weight from one foot to another, then settles firmly on both feet, and the 
heart inside his chest pounds violent as he thinks of the death spirits, and his teeth 
chatter together: but the brave man's skin will not change colour, nor is he too much 
frightened, once he has taken his place in the hidden position, but his prayer is to 
close as soon as may be in bitter division… 
 
—The Iliad 
 
 
The earliest known archeological evidence of battle can be found near the Nile 
River on the border of what is today Egypt and Sudan, dating back 15,000 years.  The 
Sumerians used carvings and paintings to depict organized warfare three millennia 
before the birth of Christ.  In Laconia, the Spartans considered martial prowess the 
highest virtue and organized their entire society around warfare and warrior principles 
that are still used today in Western military doctrine.9  The heroic actions of King 
Leonidas at Thermopylae sparked the imagination of poets and bards who kept his 
memory alive throughout the ages, a tradition that is now maintained by Hollywood 
in the form of blockbuster movies.  
 Homer’s Iliad, a war story in dactylic hexameter, has been adapted repeatedly 
by screenwriters and playwrights for modern consumption, demonstrating a lasting 
fascination with the wartime escapades of the ancient Greeks.  Arguably, Homer’s 
work remains relevant today not simply because of the heroics exhibited by the 
characters, but because the individuals he wrote about faced complicated and timeless 
emotional and spiritual dilemmas.  Homer used them to reveal aspects of human 
                                                 
9 John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 242-43. 
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nature that are uncomfortable for many to consider, including the fear or thrill one 
feels before battle or the wrenching pain of losing a comrade.  In choosing to write 
about this often unseen aspect of war, Homer added a layer of complexity and depth 
to his subjects in an effort to reveal the varied emotional and psychological 
dimensions of warfare.  Hektor and Achilles are endearing characters in the Iliad 
precisely because they exhibit the full spectrum of emotions associated with killing 
and warfare, not in spite of it.  The tears Achilles sheds over the slain Patroclus are no 
different than those shed by countless others in battle throughout history.  
The Romans moved away from endemic warfare common to societies of the 
Classical period and instead forged an empire through total war.  For two hundred 
years Roman expansion had meant the death or enslavement of thousands of people. 
The appearance of the Aquila of Rome portended doom for their military and civilian 
opponents.  If not killed outright, their conquered foes were often sent to die on the 
blood-soaked sands of the Flavian Amphitheatre as tribute to the glory of Rome.  The 
lust for death and violence permeated Roman society and was institutionally 
sanctioned as a means of reinforcing values important to the ruling class and the 
military.10  The citizenry reveled in the pageantry and sadism of gladiatorial events –
fascinated by the spectacle of gruesome murder, blood, and mayhem. 
Yet even in an environment of unfettered state-condoned violence, killing for 
the individual was still a traumatic affair for all involved.  Take for example Seneca 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 146-47, 263-64. 
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the Younger’s writing about a midday trip to the Colosseum in Rome and what he 
witnessed: 
 
In the morning, men are thrown to lions and bears. At mid-day they 
are thrown to the spectators themselves. No sooner has a man killed, 
than they shout for him to kill another, or to be killed. The final victor 
is kept for some other slaughter. In the end, every fighter dies. And all 
this goes on while the arena is half empty. 
 
You may object that the victims committed robbery or were 
murderers. So what? Even if they deserved to suffer, what's your 
compulsion to watch their sufferings? 'Kill him', they shout, 'Beat him, 
burn him'. Why is he too timid to fight? Why is he so frightened to kill? 
Why so reluctant to die? They have to whip him to make him accept 
his wounds.11 
 
Seneca observed that even when faced with imminent death and an 
opportunity for deliverance existed, butchering another human in cold blood 
was too much for many to bear.  His description of individuals paralyzed with 
fear at the prospect of killing, regardless of the fact that doing so could mean 
saving their own lives, matches modern accounts of soldiers and law 
enforcement officers as we will see in Chapter Three. 
 The Romans and Greeks are just two examples of societies that 
embraced and reinforced martial prowess and killing at odds with the timidity 
displayed above, though many more such examples exist.12  One could choose 
to examine Samurai society in Japan during the Sengoku period, the 
                                                 
11 Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Seneca: Letters From A Stoic, trans. Robin Campbell (New York: Penguin 
Press, 1969), 41-43.  
12 Gwynne Dyer, War (New York: Crown Publishers, 1985), 26. 
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Mongolian war bands of the thirteenth century, or the Maori clans of New 
Zealand and find they shared many of the same cultural values associated with 
killing.13,14,15  The key point is that regardless of a fascination with warfare 
and culturally reinforced norms that advocated bloodshed as a virtue –
plunging a sword into another human’s body was no easy thing.  
 During his time as a combat historian, Marshall rediscovered this truth 
about killing through his discussions with fighting men.  By observing their 
behavior on the sun-bleached beaches of the Pacific and in the frozen 
windswept forests of the Ardennes, he prompted the American military 
establishment to reexamine and reflect upon its training doctrines.  Ultimately 
this line of inquiry resulted in many of the programs and methods used today 
to train U.S. combat soldiers to overcome inherent resistance to taking life.  
Killology as a burgeoning field of study today would not exist if it were not 
for Marshall’s pioneering research on the behavior of men in combat. 
 
 
“Slam” 
 
Good God, you must be dumber than I thought. Your initials spell SLAM and 
you don't realize that's money in the bank? It's perfect for a sports editor. It's 
perfect for anything. Nobody can forget that name. 
 
—Tad Dorgan 
                                                 
13 John Keegan and Richard Holmes, Soldiers: A History of Men in Battle (New York: Viking, 1986), 
16-18, 50. 
14 Stephen Turnbull, The Samurai: A Military History (New York: Routledge, 1977), 106-8. 
15 Keith Sinclair, The Origins of the Maori Wars (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2013), 113-
16. 
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While never claiming to be a scholar of warfare, Samuel Lyman Atwood 
Marshall certainly was a participant.  Born at the turn of the century in Catskill, New 
York and raised in El Paso, Texas he was the son of a brickmaker. He served in the 
First World War as a sergeant in the 315th Engineers of the 90th Division after leaving 
school to enlist at the age of seventeen.  There he witnessed first-hand the terrible cost 
of war.  During the Second World War Marshall reentered the U.S. Army in 1942 as 
a major in the Information Branch, Special Service Division pf the War Department.  
By 1943 and now a lieutenant colonel, Marshall was assigned to the newly 
established Historical Division of the General Staff (G-2), which was mainly 
concerned with recording the operational and administrative histories of the armed 
services.   
Under the auspices of President Roosevelt, this program was implemented to 
collect and record the wartime experiences of U.S. forces around the world something 
that was beyond the limited capabilities of the existing War College historical 
section.16 F.D.R. and top military advisors accurately believed that by producing a 
series of historical monographs that critically examined specific military operation, 
U.S. commanders and their men could potentially benefit from the analysis provided.  
Marshall was immediately tasked with writing a definitive analysis of the recently 
conducted Doolittle Raid on Tokyo.  
                                                 
16 John E. Jessup and Robert W. Coakley, A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History 
(Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1979), 287-92. 
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Toward the end of 1943, Marshall and his team were attached to the 27th 
Infantry Division during the assault on Makin Atoll in the Gilbert Islands, and later as 
part of the 7th Infantry Division at Kwajalein Island.  During these campaigns 
Marshall developed the methodology behind the AARs he used to investigate the 
experience of soldiers in combat.17  His methodology relied heavily upon group 
interviews and first-hand witnesses, leading some to challenge his methods, yet his 
conclusions were generally insightful.  Following his work in the Pacific in June of 
1944, he was sent on temporary assignment to the European Theater of Operations 
where he applied his AAR technique to veterans of the D-Day landings in Normandy 
and of the Ardennes campaign.  He would remain in Europe until the end of the war, 
and in 1945 was promoted to theater historian.  A year later he returned to the U.S. 
and continued his career as a journalist for the The Detroit News, his employer since 
1927. 
It is worth briefly mentioning Marshall’s career as a journalist and editorial 
writer before and after the war, as this has been called a blessing and a curse by both 
his benefactors and detractors with regards to his contributions to reform in the U.S. 
military.  Some historians and members of the military have argued that because 
Marshall spent the majority of his non-military life as a journalist, the tradecraft he 
learned working first for the El Paso Herald and then in Detroit, trained him to focus 
                                                 
17 Williams and Canedy, SLAM, 21-2.  
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on the crux of an issue.  F.D.G. Williams, in his book SLAM: The Influence of S.L.A. 
Marshall on the United States, writes the following about the subject: 
 
Marshall's hallmark was his keenness for detail and his eye for the 
dramatic. He was adept at telling a story full of color and excitement, a 
story which often focused on the activities of common people 
accomplishing uncommon things. Such stories found their way into 
volumes of articles and books which caught the interest of many and 
served as Marshall's vehicle for presenting his ideas and insights. The 
color and simplicity of his writing style assured him a strong 
following. Without this dramatic and yet simple style, he could not 
have contributed as much as he did to military affairs.18 
  
This writing style endeared Marshall to many and aided him in his rise to 
prominence as a journalist-historian.  This also serves to highlight the fact that 
Marshall was by training a journalist, and his efforts did not include scientific 
methodology as it is currently practiced in sociology, political science and 
psychology.  For this reason he has been accused of being less scholar and 
more newsman, indulging in sensationalist writing associated with journalism 
of the time.  But, beyond his scholarly and journalistic talent, Marshall’s 
personality also won him many friends and allies among his colleagues, and 
when in the service, his superiors and subordinates.19 
 Marshall has been described as bold, flamboyant, gregarious, and 
ambitious –excellent traits for a newsman and a combat historian.  Williams 
describes Marshall as “seemingly indomitable” and “He was what some 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 6-7. 
19 Ibid. 
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people would call a character.”  Both of these traits helped win him the 
respect of the men he interviewed and among his followers in academic and 
military circles.20 
 Paradoxically, the same traits that propelled him to success were also 
the source of some trouble for him.  Marshall was also described as arrogant, 
argumentative, and stubborn; like many polarizing figures throughout history, 
when meeting him one was either charmed or repulsed.  The strong reactions 
he elicited are best summarized in the vicious personal attacks aimed at him 
by a former pupil and beneficiary of his patronage, David Hackworth. 
 In his critically acclaimed memoir About Face: The Odyssey of an 
American Warrior, Hackworth is especially vitriolic towards Marshall, 
accusing him of being a hustler, phony, and “less a military analyst than a 
military ambulance chaser, more a voyeur than a warrior.”21  This alone is not 
terribly startling, and can even be expected given Marshall’s polarizing 
personality.  However as historian A. J. Bacevich points out in his review of 
About Face, “Whether Marshall, in fact, was a “power-rapt little man who 
threw his weight around shamelessly” matters not.  That he may have been an 
intellectual fraud, as Hackworth devastatingly maintains, matters a great deal 
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to those who turn to Marshall’s writings for insights into the behavior of 
soldiers in battle.”22 
 Was Marshall a self-promoting sensationalist who was only looking 
for a story that had “juice”, as Hackworth claims?  Perhaps, but no more than 
his detractor and protégé in this case, Hackworth himself has been the target 
of accusations that he also played fast and loose with figures and facts.23  
Regardless of his propensity to exaggerate or highlight the more exciting 
elements of his military experiences through writing, Marshall was able to 
identify and analyze a previously unidentified problem in the front lines, 
drawing attention to issues that otherwise might have gone unnoticed.  John 
Keegan, eminent military historian at the Royal Military Academy at 
Sandhurst, summarized Marshall’s contributions eloquently when he wrote:     
 
Marshall's ultimate purpose in writing was not merely to describe and 
analyze...but to persuade the American Army that it was fighting its 
wars the wrong way...His arguments were consonantly effective, so 
that he had the unusual experience for a historian of seeing his 
message not merely accepted in his own lifetime but translated into 
practice.24   
 
This was Marshall’s most enduring legacy.  Though he thought otherwise 
throughout the latter-half of his life, Marshall’s writings and theory on the 
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nature of man in combat challenged established doctrine and prompted 
apparently corrective measures in training. 
 Having made a good reputation for himself through his publications, 
the U.S. Army called upon him again for a data-gathering operation in Korea 
from 1950 to 1951 as part of the Army’s Operations Research Office, and for 
a second time in 1953 as a war correspondent attached to the 7th Infantry 
Division.  He collected numerous combat interviews through his AARs which 
he analyzed and submitted to senior officials detailing proposals to increase 
U.S. infantry and weapon effectiveness.25  During this second visit to Korea, 
he witnessed the infamous Battle of Pork Chop Hill, where Chinese 
Communists threatened to overrun U.S. positions in an effort to test the 
resolve of the United Nations while peace negotiations were taking place.26  
Later, Marshall published a book about the battle and sold the rights to 
Hollywood for a 1959 film adaptation of the battle starring Gregory Peck, Rip 
Torn, and George Peppard.  His opinion about the future of warfare based on 
his time in Korea cemented his view that new technology would not replace 
conventional arms.  He was hesitant to embrace the trend in military thinking 
during the 1950s that increasingly argued that nuclear weaponry and advanced 
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aviation technology would be a panacea for future wars.27  In typical fashion, 
Marshall went against the grain and vociferously asserted that the common 
infantryman was still the deciding factor in any war. 
Marshall officially retired from the Army Reserve in 1960 with the 
rank of brigadier general, but was asked to serve as an un-official instructor in 
Vietnam from 1966 to 1967.  Charged with educating junior officers and non-
commissioned officers in his AAR techniques, Marshall worked intimately 
with Hackworth, who at the time, not surprisingly, wrote very fondly of 
Marshall.  Hackworth credited Marshall as co-author of his 2003 publication 
The Vietnam Primer, a critique of counterinsurgency methods during the war.  
In 1977 Marshall died at his home in El Paso, and was buried will full military 
honors.  He was survived by his third wife Catherine and four children.   
Aside from participating in the four American wars, Marshall also 
witnessed the Sinai War of 1956 after Israelis smuggled him into the country, 
and later the Six-Day War of 1967.28 He also observed the crisis in Lebanon 
in 1958, the civil war in the Congo in 1961, and the unrest in Southwest 
Africa in 1965.  During his life Marshall had also maintained a thirty-year 
correspondence with the brilliant British mechanized-war theorists Basil 
Liddell Hart and J.F.C. Fuller that began in the early 1930’s.  Marshall spent 
                                                 
27 Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1947), 29-33. 
28 Williams and Canedy, SLAM, 68, 85-87. 
23 
 
time with iconic U.S. leaders such as Omar Bradley, General George C. 
Marshall, George Patton, Dwight Eisenhower, F.D.R., and William 
Westmoreland, all of whom had a favorable opinion of his efforts to improve 
the U.S. military.29  
    In his long career as a journalist, soldier, and military commentator, 
Marshall wrote more than thirty books.  He produced dozens of journal 
articles, countless newspaper, radio, and television pieces and delivered 
hundreds of speeches at civic-clubs, universities, war colleges, and on military 
bases and around the world.  Some of his more well-known works include The 
Soldier's Load and The Mobility of a Nation (1950); The River and the 
Gauntlet (1953); Pork Chop Hill: The American Fighting Man in Action, 
Korea, Spring, 1953 (1956); and Night Drop: The American Airborne 
Invasion of Normandy (1962).  Ironically, when considering the prolific rate at 
which Marshall published material, relatively little has been written about the 
man himself.  Marshall wrote an autobiography in 1979 titled Bringing up the 
Rear, and countless personal tales exist from those who interacted with him; 
yet his full story remains elusive, waiting for future scholars to paint a more 
complete picture of his life.  To date, historians Thomas F. Burdett, F.D.G. 
Williams, and Roger Spiller have lead this effort—contributing immensely to 
my own efforts in this work.  
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Men Against Fire and the Ratio of Fire 
 
The art of leading, in operations large or small, is the art of dealing with 
humanity, of working diligently on behalf of men, of being sympathetic with 
them, but equally, of insisting that they make a square facing toward their 
own problems. 
 
—S. L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire, 1947 
 
 
Marshall’s 1947 publication, Men Against Fire deserves special 
consideration, since it is central to the origin of killology and is therefore 
essential to this thesis.  Considered his most controversial work and arguably 
one of his greatest contributions to military history, it generated the most 
intense criticism of his research methods, leading many experts decry him as a 
fraud in recent decades.  But, for the academic and military community this 
was a serendipitous event. As an unintended consequence of his polarizing 
statements, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and 
military scholars around the country began seriously assessing training 
protocol with an eye towards reform.  Created on July 1st, 1973 under General 
William E. DePuy, who had worked closely with Marshall during World War 
II and throughout his career, TRADOC is today the branch of the U.S. Army 
concerned with developing new methods of training officers and enlisted men 
for the future of warfare.    
Contained within its pages is a detailed analysis of infantry tactics 
used in World War II by the U.S. Army.  Issues such as troop load-bearing 
25 
 
capabilities, unit cohesion, terrain, and the problems a field commander is 
likely to encounter are discussed based upon Marshall’s first-hand 
experiences. He also sets a chapter aside to describe the likely nature of war in 
the future, stating emphatically, “The final act will always be an act of the 
battlefield, whether the ground forces which achieve it move by overland 
transport or by sea or by air,” and, “Air power is essential to national survival. 
But air power unsupported by the forces of the battlefield is a military means 
without an end.”30  This warning has repeatedly fallen on deaf ears in 
Washington, despite Marshall’s admonition from many decades past.  Finally, 
throughout this book Marshall reasserts his opinion about the continuing 
primacy of infantry in warfare, contrary to what some were predicting based 
upon the rapidity of technological innovation.   
The chapter titled, “Ratio of Fire” garnered the most excitement and 
criticism due to the figures he presented within regarding combatant 
participation of U.S. infantrymen in World War II. His conclusion shocked 
senior officers and challenged the orthodoxy of existing training doctrines 
when he claimed: 
 
The proportions varied little from situation to situation. In an average 
experienced infantry company in an average stern day's action, the 
number engaging with any and all weapons was approximately 15 per 
cent of total strength. In the most aggressive infantry companies, under 
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the most intense local pressure, the figure rarely rose above 25 per cent 
of total strength from the opening to the close of action.31 
 
At first, and perhaps inevitably, Marshall’s discovery was not well received.  
Williams suggests the reason behind the initially poor reception of Marshall’s ratio-
of-fire concept was because “many misunderstood Marshall to be saying that the 
American soldier was a coward.”32  If examined as a singular argument, the 
misinterpretation of what Marshall was proposing is understandable.  But if examined 
within the context of the greater work it is clear that Marshall is arguing a larger 
point.  What Marshall was also arguing is that on the battlefield, the most decisive 
and critical point in any war, a small handful of men do the killing necessary for 
victory.  Reasons for why this is are varied.  Some men may be carrying ammunition, 
some are paralyzed with fear, and some are suppressed by enemy fire or trapped in 
unfavorable terrain.  Others, such as NCOs might be directing the shooting, medics 
may be patching up wounded comrades, and yet others may be firing in the general 
direction of the enemy without actually aiming their weapon or pretending to fire 
altogether.   
Not surprisingly, Marshall’s assertion raised serious questions and invited 
scholars from various disciplines to evaluate his work in relation to their respective 
fields.  Psychologists were interested in the physiological impact of killing and why it 
came more readily to some combatants over others.  Sociologists and philosophers 
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were interested in the socio-cultural implications of such an observation, what it 
might mean about the human capacity for violence, and the role of society in 
influencing such behavior.  Most importantly, however, the military establishment 
and military scientists were alarmed about the dangerous implication such a statistic 
offered.  If only a small fraction of front line troops actually fired their weapons at the 
enemy with the intent to injure or kill, as Marshall claimed, then the U.S. military was 
doing something terribly wrong when it came to preparing its troops for battle.  Or 
were they?  
Much like the man who proposed the ratio of fire theory, it had a divisive 
quality about it.  Once the academic and military community had taken time to digest 
his thesis, attack and praise were heaped on Marshall in fairly equal measure.  
Initially, his findings filled a void in tactical military doctrine which he believed had 
been overlooked.  “But as I said in the beginning, it is an aspect of infantry combat 
which goes unheeded.  So far as the records show, the question has never been raised 
by anyone: During engagement, what ratio of fire can be expected from a normal 
body of well-trained infantry under average conditions of combat?”33  Though this is 
not necessarily true, as we shall see in Chapter Two, Marshall was correct if his 
statement is applied only to American records of fire-ratios.  The militaries of 
European countries had previously visited the subject, such as the Prussians and 
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French, but their findings were from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and were 
subsequently thought obsolete or of no real value.  
The ratio-of-fire figure presented in Men Against Fire ultimately became the 
hallmark of the book, and was the single most disputed fact ever penned by Marshall.  
For example, in 1988, Professor Roger J. Spiller of the Combat Studies Institute in 
Fort Leavenworth Kansas offered one of the better known critiques of Marshall’s 
methodology and conclusions in an article published in the Royal United Services 
Institute Journal entitled "S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire".  Spiller’s article 
says of Marshall: 
 
That he had seen a great deal of soldiers going about their deadly work 
was no empty boast, however. This mantle of experience, acquired in 
several guises, protected him throughout his long and prolific career as 
a military writer, and his aggressive style intimidated those who would 
doubt his arguments. Perhaps inevitably, his readers would mistake his 
certitude for authority.34 
 
More problematic are the charges levied against him by Spiller that his methodology 
was flawed.  The following conclusion is reached after working out the math 
surrounding the number of units Marshall claims to have interviewed, the time he 
claimed to have spent with each, and how long he was actually in the vicinity to 
perform the AARs: 
 
Opportunity aplenty existed in Europe: more than 1200 rifle 
companies did their work between June 1944 and V-E day, 10 months 
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later. But Marshall required by his own standard two and sometimes 
three days with a company to examine one day's combat. By the most 
generous calculation, Marshall would have finished "approximately" 
400 interviews sometime in October or November 1946, or at about 
the time he was writing Men Against Fire. 
 
Marshall's own personal correspondence leaves no hint that he was 
ever collecting statistics. His surviving field notebooks show no signs 
of statistical compilations that would have been necessary to deduce a 
ratio as precise as Marshall reported later in Men Against Fire.  The 
"systematic collection of data" that made Marshall's ratio of fire so 
authoritative appears to have been an invention.35 
 
This is a harsh indictment indeed; Spiller accuses Marshall of intellectual 
dishonesty, which is the death knell for any scholar.  Why then should any 
serious military historian, sociologist, or psychologist bother with Marshall’s 
supposed works of fiction?  Surprisingly, Spiller provides the best argument 
himself in the same article:     
 
The axiom upon which so much of his reputation has been built 
overshadows his real contribution. Marshall's insistence that modern 
warfare is best understood through the medium of those who actually 
do the fighting stands as a challenge to the disembodied, mechanistic 
approaches that all too often are the mainstay of military theorists and 
historians alike.36 
 
 
Marshall’s contribution to the larger field of infantry tactics and combat psychology 
created substantive improvements in infantry combat training.  Men Against Fire was 
so highly regarded for its combat analysis aside from the disputed ratio of fire, that 
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the Israeli military had distributed the entire book among their armed forces in the 
early 1950s.37  Though a violation of copyright, this was a remarkable stamp of 
approval; the Israelis were virtually fighting on all fronts against numerically superior 
enemies using large numbers of citizen-soldiers.  Marshall’s insight into the 
psychological and tactical difficulties of delivering effective fire and of the problems 
faced by command in battle was disseminated at all levels.  Israel’s fighting men and 
women referred to this work during some of their most difficult conflicts, perhaps the 
indicator of its worth.     
The same year that Spiller published his scathing assessment of Men Against 
Fire, the highly-regarded Israeli combat psychologist Ben Shalit published The 
Psychology of Conflict and Combat.  In it, Shalit viewed Marshall’s work from a 
psychological perspective, drawing upon the combat experiences of the Israeli 
Defense Force for comparison.38  Though Shalit also finds the ratio of fire 
problematic, he acknowledges the overarching premise of the book that men in 
combat must overcome psychological inhibitions against killing other humans.  He 
asserts that when soldiers overcome resistance to homicide, they are able to deliver 
more effective fire support at critical moments in an engagement.39   
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Shalit claims specifically that in his experience “nearly 100 percent fired, 
when told to do so or when circumstances demanded.”  He continues, “my very 
strong impression (as well as my own experience) is that firing is a very effective 
method of relieving tension and fear, and is often engaged in even when there is no 
need for it.”40  This statement appears to refute Marshall’s claim, but while it is true 
that the ratio of fire has, as a rule, increased, this was not unforeseen by Marshall.  
Additionally, simply firing a weapon as therapy for jittery nerves as opposed to 
aiming it at a human with an intent to kill, still fits within a larger narrative of 
intrinsic human resistance to killing as proposed by Grossman and others.      
 By the time of his death, Marshall had amended his original ratio upward in 
response to the new technological and tactical methods being employed in Korea and 
Vietnam.  In Korea, U.S. infantry platoons were increasingly issued larger numbers of 
machine guns and other crew-manned weapons, significantly increasing their ratio of 
fire.  Marshall revised his estimate on the number of frontline combatants 
participating in shooting at the enemy at around fifty percent.41  Likewise, in Vietnam 
the common grunt possessed more lethal fire capability in his M-16 than an entire 
squad of Germans armed with bolt-action Mauser rifles possessed in World War II.  
He also accurately understood that as the communication capability of field officers 
and NCO’s expanded through the use of increasingly portable radio technology, the 
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direct control necessary for increased rates of fire among infantrymen, would 
improve.42  He was convinced that corrective measures applied to combat training 
techniques in the U.S. military would improve the volume of fire produced by U.S. 
soldiers, and by extension lead to more tactical success.  This has largely proven to be 
true. 
As a final thought on the debate about the accuracy of Marshall’s ratio of fire 
theory and whether or not it is an indictment against all his work, Kelly C. Jordan 
submits: 
 
While surprising enough on their own, Marshall’s findings have 
become even more controversial over the last decade, when other 
veterans and scholars have investigated Marshall’s methodology and 
found his figures based largely on unsubstantiated or nonexistent data.  
Despite his flawed historical methods, Marshall was a keen observer 
of human beings in battle, having watched soldiers fighting in at least 
five different wars across the globe.  His studies comprise, with few 
exceptions, the entire body of work regarding the participation of 
soldiers in combat.  If for no other reason, this suggests that they 
perhaps contain some information of value.43 
 
Why is this important? Based on the poignant questions raised about the 
quality and usefulness of Men Against Fire, one can conclude that the truth about the 
ratio of fire lies somewhere in the middle as is often the case with spectacular claims.  
The previous examples are used to demonstrate both sides of the argument 
surrounding the ratio of fire, and the heated discourse that continues today.  That 
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Marshall’s claim is incredibly contentious is critical to understanding the nature of the 
arguments that surround the discipline of killology.  
Marshall’s cardinal sin was that he provided little evidence to support his 
ratio-of-fire figure.  Instead, he probably used a combination of experience, intuition, 
and imagination to arrive at a number sensational enough to warrant attention, yet 
believable enough to pass inspection.44  By the end of his time in Vietnam, his 
estimate of the ratio of fire had grown to eighty percent, which only served to sharpen 
his critic’s accusations of shoddy methodology.  Marshall countered by arguing that 
improved weapon technology, tactical training, and leadership techniques formed the 
basis for the dramatic increase.  It is also possible that Marshall’s new figures were 
emblematic of his desire to mitigate criticism, and further bolster his claim that the 
AAR procedure was leading to progress in the field.  For this he was excoriated by 
some members of academia and the military community who claimed that he was a 
total fraud.  However, regardless of the veracity of such claims, it is undoubtedly true 
that he also moved the discussion of how people behave in combat into new arenas 
and in new directions.  He unwittingly bridged an interdisciplinary gap by bringing 
elements of psychology, sociology, and military science together in an effort to 
improve the tactics of the U.S. army.   
Researching history over the years has revealed the occasionally 
uncomfortable truth that regardless of an individual’s greatness or achievements—
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every man has feet of clay.  Marshall was no exception.  But it is also true that on 
balance, Men Against Fire promoted Marshall’s belief that when all is said and done, 
the man in the foxhole or in the trench is the one responsible for winning wars.  
Military historian Russell W. Glenn echoes this thought when he wrote “In 1947, 
nuclear weapons dominated the thinking of many United States military leaders.  
Marshall recognized what so many failed to see: despite the unprecedented power of 
these weapons, man is still the fundamental element in war.”45  Clearly this is a 
tribute to his basic grasp of the reality of war, something that he felt was beginning to 
be forgotten by many policymakers caught up in the heady days of innovation and 
scientific advances following World War II.   
Technology can improve our methods of delivering death and carnage to 
fellow humans, but without the lowly private to capitalize on this killing power, it is 
of limited value.  Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan have proven that technology alone 
is not enough.  Drones and high-altitude bombing have never, and likely never will, 
replace the role of infantry in war.  The newsman from Texas understood this during 
a time when air power, armor, and nuclear technology were increasingly seen as the 
defining weapons of future wars.  Predictably, he went against the prevailing winds in 
search of the real story, as was his custom.   
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Chapter Two 
 
 
 
Korea and Reform: Changing the Equation 
 
They wrote in the old days that it is sweet and fitting to die for one's country. 
But in modern war, there is nothing sweet nor fitting in your dying. You will die like a 
dog for no good reason. 
 
36 
 
—Ernest Hemingway, Notes on the Next War, 1935 
 
 
In 1942 the Red Army was in a desperate contest for survival against the 
Wehrmacht.  The Axis forces had penetrated deep into the Soviet Union since 
Operation Barbarossa opened the war on the Eastern Front in June of 1941.  During 
the life-and-death struggle that characterized the slaughter in the east, desperate 
measures were commonly employed by both sides.  The Soviets, true to form, drew 
upon all available resources in an effort to resist the German onslaught.  Included 
among the war material available was a legion of 50,000 dogs—a footnote generally 
overlooked by historians writing about the war.46   
This omission is understandable given the degree of suffering and loss of life 
around the world; the butcher’s bill for the Second World War is estimated at 
between 50 and 60 million total dead, though some estimates are much lower.47  Yet, 
regardless of the total dead, there is a unique lesson to be learned through closer 
scrutiny of the anti-tank dogs the Soviets employed against German armor.  The 
lesson was not about the merits of the hundeminen, or dog-mines; rather it was the 
method by which their handlers trained them to carry out their macabre task that 
intrigued both medical professionals and the U.S. military alike. 
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Ivan Pavlov’s concept of conditional reflex, popularly known as classical 
conditioning, was a key ingredient in the behavioral therapy applied to the Red Army 
dogs.  Pavlov who had received the 1904 Nobel Prize for his work, proved that 
physiological responses to stimuli could be predicted, trained, and reinforced.  The 
most famous example of this process was the increased salivation by dogs when 
presented with a stimulus previously associated with food, such as ringing a bell.  
Armed with this basic understanding of psychological conditioning, Stalin’s dog 
handlers buried food underneath stationary Soviet tanks before releasing half-starved 
dogs collected from all throughout Russia to claim their prize.  The dogs would then 
belly-crawl under the tank’s front glacis in an effort to retrieve the reward.  Ideally 
during this activity a vertical lever jutting above the dog’s shoulders would trigger an 
explosive package attached to the dog’s harness leading to a detonation that would 
destroy or immobilize the tank.48  This ambitious foray into weaponizing animals 
through modern conditioning techniques was a spectacular failure. 
The rudimentary explosive devices failed frequently enough that the ingenious 
Soviet handlers decided to remotely detonate the mines strapped to the dog or use a 
timer device just prior to attacking.  Unfortunately for both the dogs and their 
handlers, the rudimentary training did not account for various elements common to 
the battlefield; stimuli that could not be overcome through conditioning, such as the 
strange smells and sounds of German armor on the attack, sent the dogs fleeing back 
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to their terrified masters with live explosives!  Ultimately the program was scrapped 
in favor of rescue and recovery training for the remaining Soviet dogs, which became 
scarce as the Wehrmacht policy was to kill all dogs encountered in occupied territory 
as a preventative measure.49  
The discovery of conditional reflex and the tenets associated with classical 
conditioning created new avenues of research in behaviorism, but it was the 
American B. F. Skinner and his work with pigeons and rats that built upon this 
knowledge to develop new techniques for use in conditioning animals.  In 1938 
Skinner coined the term operant conditioning, building upon Edward Thorndike’s 
Law of Effect which concerned learning in animals.50  By introducing reinforcers 
alongside operants already established in behaviorism such as punishment, Skinner 
trained animals to predictably select the correct trigger to gain a reward.51  Operant 
conditioning for the purposes of this work can be generally understood as organisms, 
including humans, moving through their environments rather haphazardly until they 
encounter a reinforcing stimulus. The experience of that stimulus becomes associated 
in memory with the behavior that immediately preceded it.   
The medical community began searching for possible ways to apply this new 
understanding about motivation and behavior hoping to unlock a successful formula 
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for human psychological conditioning.  Not surprisingly, a guaranteed method for 
manipulating humans to the degree possible in the carefully regulated environment of 
a laboratory was impossible.  Nonetheless, the practical application of lessons 
gleaned from advances in psychological-conditioning was of great interest to the U.S. 
military.      
The U.S. Army saw potential for enhanced training techniques using 
Skinner’s formula.  By the opening of hostilities in Korea in June of 1950 it had 
begun tentatively integrating the latest psychological discoveries made during the 
post-war period in an effort to address the alarmingly low ratio of fire Marshall 
reported.  Though it is inaccurate to say Marshall bears sole responsibility for the new 
concepts applied to basic and field training, it is clear his after-action reviews and 
alarmist tendencies got the proverbial ball rolling in the right direction.52 The 
momentum he created to find more effective means of training soldiers to kill, 
acknowledged by the military establishment, was complemented by the work of 
Pavlov, Thorndike, and Skinner. 
Prior to Korea and Vietnam, combat training in the U.S. Army since its 
formation in 1775 was largely concerned with practical military exercises and 
managing and maintaining equipment.  Repetition played an inordinate role in this 
process, where recruits used rote memorization to complete the manual of arms, 
marching, responding to the various drum cadences, and above all—following orders 
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without question.  This methodology was successful in terms of preparing ill-trained 
farmers and shopkeepers for war; it was also successfully used in training the 
conscripts and volunteers of the American Civil War.  Grossman writes, “The concept 
of drill had its roots in the harsh lessons of military success on battlefields dating 
back to the Greek phalanx. Such drill was perfected by the Romans. Then, as firing 
drill, it was turned into a science by Frederick the Great and then mass-produced by 
Napoleon.”  Prussia’s warrior-king Frederick II, or as he is more popularly known 
Frederick the Great, conducted experiments designed to measure the shooting 
accuracy and training of his army during the eighteenth century.  What he discovered 
was startling. 53 
In their work Soldiers: A History of Men in Battle, John Keegan and Richard 
Holmes explain that “Old Fritz” ordered a one-hundred foot wide by six-foot tall 
piece of canvass attached to wood uprights to roughly represent the size of an 
opposing regiment of the line (200-1000 men).  At 225 yards the Prussian regiment 
armed with smoothbore muskets scored a hit rate of 25%. At 150 yards it increased to 
40%, and at 75 yards 60% percent of the infantrymen found their mark.  It would then 
stand to reason, that a 200-man regiment firing at an opponent 75 yards away would 
reduce their number by around 120 in the first volley.54  However, when similar line 
regiments fought in real battles, the number killed in the first volley was far less.   
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Napoleonic and American Civil War expert and historian Paddy Griffith 
estimated that on average only one or two men were struck down per minute during 
the black-powder battles of the nineteenth century.  This number is amazing 
considering the Prussian hit rates of 60%.  What’s more, the equipment of Napoleon’s 
Grande Armée and that used by the Americans during the Civil War—was far 
superior to that available to the Prussians of Frederick’s time.  What was happening 
was that the soldiers were either non-firers, or purposely missing.55 
Despite rigorous drilling and rote memorization of battle procedures, the 
Prussians, Americans, and French were still failing to kill their opponents in numbers 
equal to the capability of their equipment and training.  That is not to say that the 
soldiers were not butchering each other, rather, they were not butchering each other 
as quickly as their commanders and the hard math predicted.  There were certainly 
instances of high casualties being inflicted in short order, but this was the exception 
to the rule.  More often the horrendous casualties associated with battles such as Cold 
Harbor and Leipzig were the result of prolonged fighting which allowed casualties to 
accumulate.  The Battle of the Nations in 1813, for example, was a four-day event 
which saw high casualties only after the assembled armies slugged it out for some 
time.  Other factors impacted the number of casualties, such as artillery and poor 
leadership, but two regiments of the line in good order could be expected to inflict 
only small numbers of casualties on each other under ordinary circumstances.56   
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Something was missing.  How was it that up until the Korea War, technology 
aside, the ratio of fire was so low?  Why did the Prussians perform so well in target 
practice, yet never came remotely close to replicating those hit percentages in battle?  
What was lacking was a concrete way of dealing with the mental strain placed upon 
soldiers in battle, and a means by which they could be taught to kill another human 
more easily.  Pavlov’s dogs and Skinner’s rats that provided some of the answers, or 
rather the lessons gleaned from their experiments that created the foundation of 
military conditioning.  The psychological edge that breakthroughs in behaviorism 
granted the U.S. military combined with rapid technological advances—changed the 
killing equation.  The application of psychological principles to the training regimen 
of U.S. soldiers after World War II, restructuring of U.S. military units, and new 
weapons of war resulted in an improved ratio-of-fire and less resistance to killing.57 
 
 
Korea 
 
So our guns fired steadily all night, the barrels got red hot and we were 
throwing water on them to try and cool them down. So we fired right through until 
dawn, until the Chinese withdrew. The Chinese were bundling up their dead and 
rolling them down the hill. They wrapped them in wire and rolled them down the hill 
and took their wounded out. 
 
—Francis Bayne, Canadian Artillery 
 
 
Korea is a special case in the march towards understanding killology and how 
the U.S. military began to overcome the resistance to killing inherent to most humans 
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after Marshall exposed the problem.  Called the “Forgotten War,” Korea is 
exceptional because it is a transitional war in terms of emergent technology and 
tactical reform.  In the beginning, the Korean War was fought with antiquated 
equipment, mostly 'leftover' items from World War II due to demobilization and size 
reductions.  By 1953 the weaponry available to the average U.S. combat regiment in 
Korea was significantly improved over that of their World War II era counterparts.  
The resulting increase in firepower capability contributed exponentially to increased 
firing rates as reflected in AARs collected by Marshall and others.58  The increased 
availability of automatic and crew-served weapon systems is occasionally overlooked 
by military historians in accounting for dramatic victories in Korea where a single 
machine-gun emplacement often meant the difference between being overrun and 
holding the line for another night.  Instead, the less glamorous weaponry of the grunt 
is overshadowed by flashy advances in aircraft technology which unarguably altered 
the entire flow of the Korean War.  Because the U.S. and United Nation air-forces 
were able to achieve superiority in the skies over Korea, the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK) was obliged to conduct operational and tactical military 
operations at night for instance. 5960   
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The technological transition to more automated weapon systems undoubtedly 
contributed to increased fire-ratios, but so did the less well-known combat unit 
reforms in the U.S. Army that occurred during the Korean War.  Fortunately, by the 
start of hostilities Marshall’s observations from World War II had sufficiently 
influenced the upper echelons of the U.S. military to begin searching for a remedy to 
the abysmally low ratio-of-fire while at the same time hurriedly restructuring obsolete 
infantry brigades and companies to meet the challenges of a dynamic battlefield.61  
The response was that members of G-1 and G-3 consulted with field commanders 
about how best to modernize line regiments, and by extension increase the percentage 
of soldiers who actively fired their weapons with the intention to kill.  However, 
throughout 1950 and early 1951 the U.S. and their allies scrambled to replace service 
units holding the line in Korea with better-trained combat troops from outside the 
Korean Theater.  Since the general drawdown after the surrender of Japan had been 
largely completed, General Douglas MacArthur, overall commander of East Asian 
operations was left a paltry force of four under-strength infantry divisions to work 
with.62  
Marshall erroneously believed that a new training doctrine that integrated 
minor conditioning tweaks, such as using human silhouette targets instead of a 
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“bullseye” during basic training, could significantly overcome the non-firing instinct 
displayed by soldiers during World War II.  Instead, during the Korean War the 
reorganization and rearming of U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) units from the 
division down to the squad contributed the most to changing the fire ratio.63  The 
addition of artillery, recoilless-rifles, anti-tank systems, and especially machine guns 
to battalions and platoons did more than the U.S. Army’s proto-conditioning 
programs of the 1950s.64  Not until the 1960s and Vietnam was operant conditioning 
in basic training anywhere near the levels required to encourage killing among the 
typical soldier.  Evidence collected by Marshall himself suggested that the addition of 
machine-gun teams and artillery companies to combat regiments between 1945 and 
1953 was a significant advantage in altering the ratio-of-fire, despite clinging to the 
belief that improved training techniques were an equally viable solution.  When the 
Korean War ended in July of 1953 the firing rate among U.S. soldiers increased to 
55% according to Marshall’s estimates.65  
Technological Innovation 
 
The first time I ever saw a jet, I shot it down. 
 
—Chuck Yeager, USAF, describing his first confrontation with a Me262 
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Technological innovation in warfighting had increased exponentially 
throughout World War II and continued unabated through the end of Vietnam, 
followed by a second explosion in military technological innovation during the 
Information Age that is still ongoing.  The breakthroughs in jet propulsion by the 
Nazis in 1944 allowed them to field the Messerschmitt 262 Schwalbe (Storm Bird), 
the world’s first operational fighter jet.  Though the Me262’s were too few in number 
and too late to enter the war to be decisive, the writing was on the wall.  Jet-powered 
aircraft were the future, and air superiority was critical.   
As propeller-driven aircraft gave way to F-80 Shooting Stars and Soviet MiG-
15s, the war in the skies was forever changed.  In 1950 the first recorded jet-to-jet kill 
was scored by Lieutenant Russel J. Brown against a MiG-15 while piloting an F-80.  
Indicative of the rate of   technological change, the swept-wing design of the MiG-15 
at the time of its downing had already made the straight-wing P-80 design obsolete; 
meanwhile the USAF had already begun producing the swept-wing F-86 Sabre as a 
counter.   
However, jet fighters were not the only stars of the Korean sky.  The Bell H-
13 helicopter, designated the “Sioux” by the U.S. Army, which began the ongoing 
tradition of naming helicopters after Native American tribes, also made its grand 
appearance and forever changed the nature of combined-arms warfare.  As the first 
large-scale helicopter procurement by the U.S. military, the H-13s were largely 
limited to scouting and medical transport duty in Korea, though the full potential of 
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the helicopter was not yet realized.  The foundation for air-assault and mobile 
operations like those of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) during the Vietnam War 
were being laid. 
On the ground, advances in vehicle and weapon design were not as drastic as 
in the sky.  Though some designs did stand out, such as the British Centurion Mk 3 
tank, which proved exceptionally effective from its combat debut during the 1950 
Pusan landing until the end of the war.  The American M41 155mm howitzer motor 
carriage provided unprecedented mobile artillery support and was so successful that 
an updated variant designated the M44 was phased in at the end of the war.  Many 
other improvements to World War II era self-propelled guns, support weapons, and 
mobility were made during the early 1950s, but their availability was the transitional 
element most significant to increasing the ratio of fire in Korea.   
 
 
Unit Reform 
 
In the usual procedure, a flash fire was delivered with maximum power for three 
minutes, the howitzers then cutting back from twelve to six rounds per tube per 
minute while maintaining the fire six minutes. In the Arsenal-Erie action, the 48th 
Field fired the maximum rate for four minutes, then suspended briefly. 
 
—S. L.A. Marshall, Pork Chop Hill  
 
 
The advances to weaponry and vehicles made during the Korean War were 
impressive.  It might be tempting to accept them as the major factor responsible for 
the improved ratio-of-fire Marshall reported.  Digging a bit deeper, however, reveals 
that restructuring of U.S. Army and United States Marine Corps combat units 
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probably played a larger role in the increased killing efficiency exhibited.  All of the 
firepower in the world is useless unless it can be brought to bear in an effective and 
efficient manner. 
 Take for instance an incident recounted by Marshall in which concentrated 
howitzer fire support, called “flash fire”, was used to effectively blunt a DPRK attack 
on a U.S. position:  
It was maintained for four minutes. Differing little from the curtain 
barrage of World War I days, the "flash fire" of Korean operations was 
an on-call, tightly sown artillery (plus 4.2 mortar) barrage, usually 
horseshoe-shaped and so dropped that it would close around the front 
and sides of an outpost ridge. The main idea of a flash fire was to 
freeze enemy infantry movement, blocking out the enemy force on the 
low ground while locking in such skirmishers as had gained the 
heights. In effect, one battery fired on each concentration, 120 rounds 
per minute, two shells breaking into the ground every second. High 
explosive and proximity fuse shells were both used in this blast, the 
balance varying according to terrain conditions. While a flash fire 
lasted, infantrymen stayed in their fighting positions.66 
 
This tactical response to a dynamic situation was only possible because more artillery 
had been attached to infantry and combat teams during the reforms of the late 1940s 
and early 1950s.  
Over sixty different United States artillery battalions served on the Korean 
Peninsula. Regular Army, Marine Corps, and National Guard battalions all played a 
role in the fighting.67  The U.S. 8th Army, which had overall responsibility for the 
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combat zone, wanted to have existing stocks of artillery divided among the three 
corps under its jurisdiction.  U.S. I, IX, and X Corps all received roughly equal 
amounts of artillery support because of restructuring.  By 1953 each of the six U.S. 
divisions in Korea had been assigned four artillery battalions each, usually consisting 
of three 105mm units for direct support of each regiment, and a 155mm unit for 
heavier general divisional support.  Outside of divisional battalions were the U.S. 
Corps artillery battalions which were for general support of each corps front and had 
enough mobility to relocate as the situation determined.  In addition to increasing 
artillery support for combat units, something which proved pivotal to their survival in 
Korea, the U.S. Army began reorganizing the heart of its organization—the infantry.   
In 1946 a conference was held at the Infantry School at Fort Benning Georgia 
in an effort to assess the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. Army unit structure.  
American combat infantry leaders reviewed tactics, doctrine, leadership, weapons, 
personnel policies, training and organization at this conference.  The conclusions and 
recommendations reached at the Infantry School formed the basis for future U.S. 
Army unit organization, equipment, and general doctrines well into the 1950s.68  The 
increased ratio-of-fire that Marshall observed in Korea was the result of restructuring 
infantry units, especially the smallest organizational elements.69  At the platoon and 
squad level changes to size and composition occurred, namely the reduction in size of 
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the combat infantry squad from twelve to nine members.  This was felt to be a size 
more easily commanded and maneuvered.  Though at face value this appears to be a 
disadvantage, the strength of reduced-size platoons and squads was offset by 
increased numbers of machine guns and other support weapons.  Whereas in World 
War II a rifle platoon had a single Browning Automatic Rifle assigned to it, towards 
the middle and latter stages of the Korean War an infantry squad was assigned at least 
one, sometimes two.  Furthermore, at the platoon level, a reformed unit had an 
effective strength of thirty-six men with five crew-served weapons as opposed to only 
three in World War II.  
Arguably the greatest change to the Table of Organization and Equipment 
(TOE) by the U.S. Army when examining combat infantry performance was the 
addition of crew-served weapons at the platoon level.  Generally speaking, during 
World War II the heavier machine-guns, mortars, and anti-vehicle weapon platforms 
were assigned to regiments and companies which in turn distributed them to their 
platoons as needed.  In Korea, individual platoons were assigned crew-served 
weapons directly.  In practice this meant that a smaller combat team could lay down 
an inordinate amount of firepower, not reliant on whatever was available at the 
company level.  U.S. infantry tactics also evolved to incorporate these changes by 
adopting some doctrine from the Wehrmacht’s playbook.  Specifically, squads would 
be organized around the light machine gun much like the Germans with their superb 
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MG 34s in World War II.70  Small unit tactics going forward emphasized the light 
machine gun as the squad’s most important piece of weaponry.  Marshall reiterated 
the importance of the BAR to a squad’s performance in his official submission of 
observations in Korea.  Entitled, “Commentary on Infantry Operations and Weapons 
Usage in Korea, Winter 1950-51,” where he states: 
In infantry operations in Korea, it is conspicuous that rifle fire 
builds up strongly around the BAR.  It is therefore reasonable to 
believe that an increase in ratio of BARs to rifles would stimulate 
stronger fire within the squad unit.  In every engagement there are 
pivotal influences—fire builds up because one man is doing a 
particular thing with his weapons and others move to support him.  
BAR action is most frequently the moving force because of the high 
mobility of the weapon and its solid fire effects.71 
 
During the long nights in Korea, an operational .30 or .50 caliber heavy 
machine gun often meant the difference between seeing the morning and being 
overrun.  Numerous first-hand accounts of Korean veterans extolling the importance 
of keeping the machine guns firing exist.  Take, for example, Sergeant Earnest Baker 
Jr. who served in the 7th Infantry Regiment of the 3rd Infantry Division.  His firsthand 
experience was that the antiquated quad-.50 caliber heavy machine gun he manned 
was crucial to supporting defensive and offensive operations.  He explained that it 
was mounted to a half-track that was often stationary in a hull-down posture, ready to 
throw serious amounts of lead into onrushing human wave attacks by the Chinese and 
North Koreans.  He says: 
                                                 
70 The Wehrmacht incorporated the machine gun into their Auftragstaktik or “Mission-Tactics” system 
of small-unit battle.  Beyond the MG34, the MG42 heavy machine gun was used. 
71 Marshall, Commentary on Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea, 54-55.  
52 
 
It's an old World War II vehicle, and you would dig it in. And then you 
had -- this gun would fire, and this gun would fire, and this gun would 
fire, and this gun would fire. They would crossfire, and every fifth 
round was a tracer. And if you wanted to light up a hillside, you just 
fired into the hills and set it on fire, and you could tell where they was 
at. You could get a good location of where they was at.72 
 
 
When asking if he was involved in defending against human wave attacks employed 
by the enemy Baker says: “Indirectly, I was. I was -- You know, we would fire 
weapons and everything, our machine guns and everything, just for our support. But, 
you know, as far as hand-to-hand or something like that, no, I wasn't.”  Finally, Baker 
answers questions regarding what exactly they fired at with their support weapons, 
whether they went for mass-ground coverage or individual targets: 
Well, at times it would be massive ground, and other times you'd have 
individuals. The same way with the tanks, you know, you had an 
individual target, or we would just follow ahead or behind giving 
support.  They would just come by -- thousands of them, you know, 
and it was like a herd of cattle, and they would overrun your hill. You 
would be back here, and they would be up -- I mean, you know, they 
just went like something wild.73 
 
 
Bakers’ statements illustrate the important role machine-guns and heavy 
support weapons played in resisting waves of enemy combatants, similar to 
the fighting in France during WWI.  However, the Chinese and DPRK faced 
much more powerful weapons than could be found in the trenches of WWI, 
while still using archaic infantry tactics.  The end result was exceedingly high 
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casualties for the DPRK and Chinese.  The Americans and their U.N. allies 
suffered mightily too, but the post-war reforms mitigated the losses they 
would have suffered without the addition of artillery and crew-served 
weapons to most combat units. 
 
 
The Psychology Behind It 
 
It seems strange . . . that a company of men can fire volley after volley at a like 
number of men at not over a distance of fifteen steps and not cause a single casualty. 
Yet such was the facts in this instance. 
 
—Benjamin McIntyre, Vicksburg 1863 
 
 
For the study of killology, Korea was a transitional war.  Marshall’s findings 
influenced the U.S. Army enough to begin moving towards a more scientific 
approach to combat training with the goal of increasing fighting performance.  
Though this shift would not become fully evident until the Vietnam War, the 
conditions necessary for fundamental changes in U.S. training doctrine were in place.  
The U.S. military was becoming a modern organization, receptive to discoveries 
made in scientific and academic fields—especially psychology.  Intangible 
psychological factors combined with unit reform most influenced the increase of 
firing rates in Korea.  What then, does the founder of killology believe are the 
specific factors that increased the ratio-of-fire in Korea?  The answer is found by 
examining the merger of psychology, sociology, and weaponry. 
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 Experience has shown that when soldiers operate a crew-served weapon, they 
are more likely to participate in battle.  By increasing the number of crew-served 
weapons in numerically smaller platoons and squads, the ratio of those participating 
in battle increased, which in turn increased the ratio-of-fire.  Grossman argues that 
fear of letting one’s comrades down, and consequently being shunned from the in-
group, encouraged soldiers to fight; therefore, having soldiers organized around 
operating crew-served weapons fostered an environment that promoted engagement.   
Jordan supports this assertion by writing, “These changes gave these units additional 
machine guns, whose operators appeared to fire in almost every engagement; 
significantly increased the proportion of crew-served weapons to riflemen; and 
allowed these units to tap into powerful small-unit sociological forces by 
transforming the squad into a more effective “primary group.”74   
The increased availability of crew-served weapons meant that squad-sized 
units became more cohesive both mentally and physically.  Physical proximity to 
fellow soldiers is also a decisive factor in promoting combat participation.  When 
individual riflemen are isolated they tend not to engage as often or with as much 
vigor as they might when under the watchful eye of their comrades.75  For example, a 
typical machine gun crew might require anywhere between two and four men, which 
in a squad of nine was a significant portion.  Because the firepower of the machine-
gun was instrumental to survival in Korea its continuing operation during a battle was 
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a priority in most cases.  This system insured that the gun crew was in immediate 
physical proximity to one another, while the remaining rifleman would disperse in 
relation to its position.  By keeping the squad within generally close proximity, 
authority could be more easily established by commanders, while at the same time the 
influence of peer pressure and mutual surveillance was applied.   
Second to the increased rates of fire due to the addition of crew-served 
weapons, artillery played a crucial role in Korea.  Artillery is unique on the battlefield 
since it allows widespread killing without the emotional strain associated with other 
combat branches; the closest similarity to any branch of the armed services would be 
to that of bomber aircraft.  In both cases, the physical proximity from the target 
removes the individual from the turmoil caused by the inner resistance to killing.  The 
bombardier and the 155mm howitzer crew both are absolved from seeing the product 
of their handiwork, unlike their comrades in the infantry.  In their minds, the enemy 
was nothing more than grids on a map, and when viewed in such a manner, it is easy 
to kill alarmingly large numbers of people without adverse psychological trauma.  
Napoleon understood this and made sure he had more artillery than his opponents 
whenever possible. He realized that they did the preponderance of killing in battle, 
especially when loaded with grapeshot.76 
 Further illustrating this point is the experience of John Phillips, an 
artilleryman with the 780th Field Artillery Battalion attached to X Corps in Korea.  He 
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described the terrible killing capability of artillery, detailing the use of air-burst timed 
shells for maximum anti-personnel effect: 
We had eight-inch guns. The shells had a bursting radius of 450 yards, 
and we often shot various kinds of shells.  But for people we'd always 
shoot shell VT which was a variable time. It would go off when it hit 
the ground if it didn't go off 60 yards, 60 feet above their head. So we 
had personnel. We'd try to shoot, shoot VT, the fuse VT so that it 
would go off. And with a 450-yard bursting radius from above, think 
of all the people you could injure.77  
 
Phillips clearly realized he had killed many of the enemy during his time with the 
780th.  However from his battery’s position three miles behind the front-line, he was 
emotionally and psychologically insulated from trauma.  Phillips continued 
explaining the carnage he had wrought on the DPRK through indirect fire:   
But anyhow, this runner came back with the information, and we shot. 
And we shot quite a few shells in there. Major Munzell let us shoot a 
lot of ammo up that night, and we blanketed that, that whole valley 
and everything where they were coming through. When it was over the 
next morning, they went in, and the South Koreans said that there were 
still 300 dead laying on the ground, and there was a Russian military 
officer with them in full dress uniform. We, we got them that night, 
but, but we didn't just kill 300. You see, when the North Koreans lose 
dead, they went out there and picked up everybody they could find and 
carry them away so we never knew how many we killed.78 
 
The scene in the valley the following morning must have been horrific, but as Phillips 
said himself—the ROK troops reported the casualties to him.  He never had to see the 
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product of his handiwork, and therefore was free to kill, only abstractly aware of the 
carnage.   
 As a corollary to the fact that artillery caused the most enemy casualties 
during the Korean War, the difference between indirect fire and direct fire is worth 
examining.79  Artillerymen were successful at avoiding the emotional cost of killing 
and war in general because they did not kill anyone directly, and no one was 
specifically trying to kill them.  As Dyer points out:  
There has never been a similar problem with getting artillerymen or 
bomber crews or naval personnel to kill.  Partly it is the same pressure 
that keeps machine-gun crews—they are being observed by their 
fellows—but even more important is the intervention of distance and 
machinery between them and the enemy; they can simply pretend they 
are not killing human beings.80  
 
But, as the Prussians had learned centuries earlier, killing your opponent at close to 
mid-range was an entirely different prospect.  Using direct fire at these ranges, while 
the screams and cries of the enemy are clearly heard, and the indescribable images 
clearly seen, adding to potential mental trauma. 
Despite this, the direct fire of the machine guns contributed significantly to 
enemy casualties in Korea.  Though not as efficient as a well-placed artillery 
bombardment the gun crews swept the field with fully-automatic fire, sometime 
simply aiming at nothing more than shadowy figures at night.  Lee Young Ho of 3rd 
Battalion, ROK Marine Corps described a night attack like this: 
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Under constant flares I could clearly see unfolding a human wave of 
Chinese soldiers approaching our lines.  “You bitches!” I cursed them 
unconsciously and pulled my heavy machine gun’s trigger.  The area 
was nothing short of pure hell.  All sorts of weapons were discharging 
their deadly bullets and shells at hellish rates.81 
 
This further reinforces Dyer’s and Grossman’s argument that distance and plausible 
deniability were helpful in overcoming the negative aspects associated with killing.  
Ho had no idea which of his rounds found their target or even what he was 
specifically firing at besides the “human wave” before him.  Regardless, Ho dutifully 
carried out his job, operating his machine gun until he was knocked unconscious by a 
grenade blast.    
 The Korean War unveiled new technology and new insight into the nature of 
killing and how best to exploit it.  Jet aircraft and helicopters were on the verge of 
irrevocably changing warfare, though it would be another decade before their true 
combat potential was realized in the skies and on the battlefields of Vietnam. As in 
World War II before, during the Korean War airpower was an essential element of 
victory both tactically and strategically.  U.S. and U.N. control of the skies created 
significant advantages, namely forcing the enemy to operate under the cloak of 
darkness, always wary of the jets and bombers overhead.   But, it was also still true 
that like World War II, the infantryman was the one who, at the end of the day, got 
the job done.  Air power has limitations that only the grunt and his weapon could 
solve.  
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Marshall’s alarmism resulted in a serious effort to restructure the U.S. Army 
for future conflicts.  His observations informed those responsible for the restructuring 
initiative in 1946 that by 1953 had ultimately created a force resembling the modern 
combat organization system that emphasizes regimental combat teams (RCT), and 
fire-support elements.  By adding artillery, machine guns, and anti-tank weaponry to 
the TOE, the average soldier was empowered by the responsibility that came with 
operating or supporting the team’s efforts.  The support weapons became a rally point 
of sorts—the piece of equipment that had to be kept firing at all costs.   
The mechanized nature of killing with machine guns helped overcome 
resistance to killing, though it would be disingenuous to claim it was a panacea to 
non-firing.  In order to further understand killology, and how it is being utilized 
today, we must examine the changes to training and psychological conditioning that 
occurred after Korea and through the 1960s.  More specifically, operant conditioning 
would begin to play a larger role in combat readiness and the capacity of U.S. soldiers 
to kill the enemy.  This will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapters.  
  The unit reforms during and preceding the Korean War necessarily lead to 
increased firing rates and enemy casualties as squads, platoons, and companies had 
more access to crew-served weapons.  The tactical lessons learned in Korea were 
scrutinized heavily by all levels of the U.S. military and across all branches.  The 
conclusion they reached was that sociological group dynamics and the availability of 
crew-served weapons were essential to increased fighting performance.  This trend 
continued until the Vietnam War when the M-60 light machine-gun became 
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indispensable to infantry platoons; additionally the infantry serving in Vietnam were 
armed with fully automatic M-16 rifles capable of firing 700 rounds per minute.  This 
technological advance in small arms along with new training doctrines organized 
around psychological conditioning led to the 90% ratio-of-fire reported by Marshall 
and others observing combat soldiers in Vietnam.       
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Chapter Three 
 
 
Vietnam: Perfecting the Math 
 
We seem bent upon saving the Vietnamese from Ho Chi Minh, even if we have to kill 
them and demolish their country to do it. I do not intend to remain silent in the face of 
what I regard as a policy of madness which, sooner or later, will envelop my son and 
American youth by the millions for years to come. 
 
—Senator George McGovern on the Senate floor on April 25, 1967 
 
“Do you remember the first time you killed someone?”  The interviewer with 
the United States Department of Veterans Affairs asked Lonnie, a balding man with 
glasses in his sixties and a Vietnam War combat veteran with deep lines etched into 
his face. Lonnie, with a wistful look simply answered “Yeah,” his head bobbing in 
agreement, seemingly to reassure himself of his participation in this act of violence.  
Visibly disturbed by the recollection of these events Lonnie continues, “I was the 
only one up there that wasn’t hurt and scared to death.”  Emphatically he repeats 
“scared to death” several more times while staring off-camera.  “Somebody get up 
here and help me!  I’m alone!”  Lonnie recalls his paralyzing fear, “and then, two 
little heads…I was down and all I could see was his head and shoulders…he had a 
hardhat on, and then I saw the red emblem.”  Lonnie, his hands now gesticulating 
wildly, begins recounting the painful event “and then, when his, when I could see a 
silhouette” Lonnie freezes and stares vacantly as the interview room falls deafeningly 
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silent. “I blasted ‘em.   Silhouettes.  They’re not real people, there are just targets!” he 
blurts out.  The interviewer waits for Lonnie to regain his composure and follows up 
with “Is that how you kinda saw it?  Would you try to disconnect them as people?”  
Lonnie calmly replies, “That was what we were taught to do…those weren’t people, 
those are silhouettes.”  
Daniel, also a Vietnam combat veteran, agreed to be interviewed as part of the 
same project and further illustrates the impact of killing in wartime.  Like Lonnie, 
Daniel was also significantly impacted by his experiences during the fighting in 
Vietnam.  Daniel tells the interviewer a story about a young Vietnamese soldier who 
was mortally maimed by the directed blast of a claymore mine.  Though Daniel 
struggles through his tale he makes it a point to mention that “It was strange you 
know, you could disassociate when you’re shooting at spots in the jungle, but this guy 
was right there, and I felt very compassionate and I was thinking about his girlfriend, 
his family, whatever.  And it was a moment I went through that I think it affected me 
a lot.”  Seemingly to convince himself as much as the interviewer, he continues, “I 
didn’t feel any personal guilt, I felt sorry for him.  My mind at the time was don’t let 
it bother you, don’t think about it, just do it.”82 
The U.S. combat troops arriving in South Vietnam in March of 1965 were the 
inheritors of advances made in combat training.  As such, the ratio of fire during the 
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Vietnam War for U.S. combatants was around 80-90%.83  Marshall wrote an analysis 
of the changing ratio of fire during Vietnam and concluded: 
According to the data basis, the U.S. infantry line in Vietnam requires 
no stimulation whatever to its employment of organic weapons when 
engaged. The fire rate among patrols in heavy, if brief, contact is not 
infrequently 100 percent. Within the rifle company, during 
engagement prolonged for several hours, the rate will run 80 percent or 
more and the only nonfirers will be the rearward administrative 
element or the more critical cases among the early wounded. It is not 
unusual for one man to engage with three or more weapons during the 
course of a two-hour fight.84 
 
These results were the culmination of a process that began with Marshall’s alarmism 
at the poor firing rates he observed in World War II, followed by subsequent reforms 
to the tactical composition of combat units and their tables of equipment in Korea.  
The reorganization of combat units around crew-served weapons, combined with 
increased availability of ranged killing power through artillery and air support, began 
moving the ratio in the desired direction.  By the start of the ground war in Vietnam 
military, psychologists and TRADOC had managed to tap into primal psychological 
and sociological forces—fundamentally altering the capacity of U.S. combatants to 
kill.85  The American soldiers in Vietnam were the most psychologically conditioned 
troops in the history of the United States armed forces; they had access to weapons 
                                                 
83 David Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (New 
York: Back Bay Books, 1995), 250. 
84 S. L. A. Marshall and David H Hackworth, Vietnam Primer: Lessons Learned (Washington.: 
Government Printing Office, 1966), 11, http://www.lzcenter.com/Documents/12891741-Army-
Vietnam-Primer-Pamphlet.pdf. 
85 Kelly C. Jordan, “Right for the Wrong Reasons: S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire in Korea,” 
The Journal of Military History 66, no. 1 (January, 2002): 137-38. 
64 
 
and training that allowed them to overcome their inherent resistance to killing, though 
perhaps not the necessary safeguards to prevent psychological trauma associated with 
combat.86  The equation for killing was close to solved, it seemed, but at what cost? 
 
The True Cost 
 
You will kill ten of us, we will kill one of you, but in the end, you will tire of it 
first. 
—Ho Chi Minh, September 1946, during negotiations with the French 
 
At the strategic and operational level, the Vietnam War cost the United States 
and its allies a tremendous amount of blood and treasure.  Roughly 60,000 Americans 
were killed in action (KIA) between 1964 and the fall of Saigon in April of 1975, 
with formal ground operations beginning in 1965 and ending by 1973.87  In terms of 
participation, over half a million personnel were in country during the peak of U.S. 
involvement in 1969, and approximately three million service men and women would 
eventually serve in Vietnam and southeast Asia throughout the conflict.88  The Army 
of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) suffered around 250,000 recorded deaths 
between 1960 and 1974, though more recent estimates put the number closer to 
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300,000 deaths.89  Under U.S. guidance and support, ARVN forces swelled to over 
one million.  The economic cost of the war to the U.S. according to the Department of 
Defense was $173 billion (over a trillion in 2016 dollars), not including costs 
associated with veteran’s benefits and interest accrued.90   
As North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh had predicted, the North 
Vietnamese Army (NVA) and their Viet Cong allies in the South paid a terrible price 
in the number of lives lost, but the lives were not sacrificed in vain.  By outlasting the 
U.S. and South Vietnamese both militarily and politically, ultimately the North 
Vietnamese dual strategic war aims of unification and independence became a reality.  
As of 1995, the Vietnamese government officially claims over one million NVA and 
Viet Cong were KIA, with some estimates as high as 1.7 million casualties.  The U.S. 
Department of Defense estimated 950,000 communist combatants were KIA, 
seemingly in line with the general consensus of historians and military experts.91   
Beyond the horrifying combat casualties during the period of U.S. 
involvement, likely the civilian population suffered even more.  In 1995 the 
Vietnamese government released an official report stating that 2 million civilians had 
been killed.92  Though incomplete, the government report was further bolstered by a 
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2008 Harvard study that lends credence to the number reported.93  Regardless of the 
exact number of civilians killed or injured, it is clear that the nature of war during 
Vietnam allowed for indiscriminate slaughter both from the air, as indicated by the 
65,000 North Vietnamese civilians killed by air strikes, and on the ground, as 
demonstrated at the infamous My Lai massacre.  Ironically, though experts estimated 
that Vietnam is the most bombed country in history, the lion’s share of the bombs 
landed in South Vietnam.94  Brian Wilson, a captain in the Air Force, recalls an 
instance of bomb-damage assessment in the Mekong Delta in which "It was the 
epitome of immorality...One of the times I counted bodies after an air strike—which 
always ended with two napalm bombs which would just fry everything that was 
left—I counted sixty-two bodies. In my report I described them as so many women 
between fifteen and twenty-five and so many children—usually in their mothers' arms 
or very close to them—and so many old people."95  Airstrikes accounted for the 
majority of civilian casualties, though how many exactly may never be known. 
Although this chapter specifically examines killing from the perspective of the 
soldier, the efficacy of airpower and artillery in Vietnam remained undiminished 
since the Korean War, if for no other reason than increased tonnage of munitions 
used.  Indeed, the U.S. military by 1965 had incorporated artillery batteries into most 
combat formations, and used a fire base system that allowed artillery coverage of U.S. 
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and ARVN operations.96   The preponderance of killing during Vietnam was still 
done through bombs, artillery, and crew-serviced weapons—which now included the 
excellent belt-fed M60 light machine gun which had proved itself repeatedly in 
battle.97  Also, the capacity to kill that comes from having greater physical proximity 
to the enemy was still incredibly important, though ground troops in the particularly 
harsh terrain of Vietnam on occasion would shed their heavier crew-serviced 
weapons such as the 107mm and 81mm mortars in exchange for mobility, or adjust 
fire support tactics as needed.98  The helicopter also came into its own during the 
Vietnam War, and by virtue of mobility, altered the nature of modern warfare 
irrevocably.  The ability to bring large volumes of firepower to a fight quickly, or 
deliver fresh troops while removing the wounded from a hot landing zone, was of 
inestimable value.99  Helicopters became integral to the day-to-day operations of U.S. 
and allied forces in Vietnam while also adding a complex vertical dimension to 
combat operations which is being further refined today above proving grounds such 
as Iraq and Afghanistan.100  Finally, it is worth noting that the number of rounds 
expended by an infantryman from an M-16 for one enemy killed in Vietnam was 
                                                 
96 Julian J. Ewell, and Ira A. Hunt, Sharpening the Combat Edge: The Use of Analysis to Reinforce 
Military Judgement (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1995), 108-09. 
97 U.S. Department of Defense, Combat Intelligence Lessons: 1969 (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1968), 27, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/20738833. 
98 Ibid,. 92. 
99 Allan R. Millett, Peter Maslowski, and William B. Feis, For the Common Defense: A Military 
History of the United States from 1607 to 2012 (New York: Free Press, 2012), 555. 
100 U.S. Department of the Army, Operations of Army Forces in the Field (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1968), 22-30. 
68 
 
approximately 50,000.101  This volume of fire per enemy KIA should not be 
surprising given the large number of combat troops that were engaging the enemy, the 
capacity for high rates of fire from U.S. small arms, the nature of the terrain, and an 
urgency to engage quickly before the enemy could disengage.  Clearly, however, U.S. 
troops were using their weapons to the utmost, and had no compunction about 
expending copious amounts of ammunition, even if only for fire suppression.   
The considerable cost in lives and money associated with the U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam is inescapable, yet there is another cost less often discussed 
in military analysis of the war’s outcome—the emotional and psychological toll.  The 
psychological damage suffered by tens of thousands of U.S. veterans is a very real 
cost that is harder to quantify, and for that reason less is often detailed in publications 
about the war.102  This was especially true during the war, when high morale was 
paramount and propaganda was liberally applied throughout training.103  Despite a 
general avoidance of the topic in technical and theoretical military courses during the 
conflict and in the decades that followed, the psychological damage to U.S. 
combatants in Vietnam was directly related to the startling kill rates achieved by the 
same men.104  
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In his book Kill Anything that Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam, 
Nick Turse discusses the degree to which U.S. troops willingly committed atrocities 
in an effort to produce results for their commanders, who in turn were urged on by the 
Pentagon.105   Due to the nature of the fighting, and under immense psychological 
strain, U.S. and allied forces committed atrocities against civilians with seemingly no 
constraint in some instances.106 Though the My Lai massacre is the most well-known 
instance of organized murder, many other massacres of varying size occurred during 
the period of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.  It is far beyond the scope of this thesis to 
mention every incident, however the key point to understand is that the psychological 
inhibitions U.S. soldiers had prior to Vietnam, such as simply firing their weapon, 
were no longer in place.107  It appears that quite the opposite was the case, since not 
only did U.S. soldiers in combat fire their weapons more frequently, they were also 
more commonly involved in ruthless pacification exercises that frequently resulted in 
killing.  The U.S. military determined that enemy body counts would be the standard 
metric by which to determine an operation’s success.108  This mentality ultimately 
resulted in a bloodthirsty attitude by field commanders and their subordinates to 
increase the “elimination ratio”.109   
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Emblematic of the desire for a high body count, Operation Speedy Express is 
a clear example of the indiscriminate killing of civilians and enemy combatants in an 
effort to get results.  The 9th Infantry Division under command of General Julian 
Ewell, with the full support of Washington, would lead the operation that was slated 
to begin in December of 1968 and last until May 1969.  Speedy Express was centered 
in the densely populated Mekong Delta and was particularly active in the provinces of 
Kien Hoa and Dinh Tuong.110  Hackworth describes Ewell as easily angered, 
demanding, and forever looking to “jack up the body count” according to David 
Hackworth, then a battalion commander.111   Operations by the 9th Infantry Division 
under Ewell resulted in extraordinary elimination ratios that were proudly displayed 
in a tactical analysis titled Sharpening the Combat Edge: The Use of Analysis to 
Reinforce Military Judgement, written by Ewell and co-authored by his then chief of 
staff Ira Hunt.  It states that just before Speedy Express began the kill ratio for the 9th 
Infantry was 14:1.  By the end of first month after operations began, the ratio was up 
to 24:1, and later escalated to a mind boggling 134:1 in April.112  Turse emphatically 
states, “Just as Ewell wanted, Vietnamese were dying all over the Delta.  They just 
weren’t, in many cases, enemy troops.”113  To further illustrate the operational 
situation on the ground, John Paul Vann, the third highest-ranking American in 
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Vietnam, succinctly summarized operations by IV Corps in the Mekong Delta as 
“many My Lais.”114   
The brutality of the fighting on the ground in operations such as Speedy 
Express and others around South Vietnam was proof enough that psychological 
restraints had been lifted in many instances, and the ratio of fire, operant 
conditioning, and a few other significant factors were at play.115  This development 
further strengthened the argument that psychology could be used in conjunction with 
better technology and training to produce an efficient killing machine out of the 
average infantryman.116  Yet, many first-hand accounts by Vietnam combat veterans, 
indicate that those who had killed other humans were still impacted by the ordeal 
despite the psychological conditioning they received which allowed them to kill in the 
first place.  To outline this point, consider Grossman’s analysis of what was 
happening: 
In Vietnam the nonfiring rate was close to 5 percent.  The ability to 
increase this firing rate though, comes with a hidden cost. Severe 
psychological trauma becomes a distinct possibility when 
psychological safeguards of such magnitude are overridden. 
Psychological conditioning was applied en masse to a body of soldiers, 
who, in previous wars, were shown to be unwilling or unable to 
engage in killing activities. When these soldiers, already inwardly 
shaken by their inner killing experiences, returned to be condemned 
and attacked by their own nation, the result was often further 
psychological trauma and long-term psychic damage.117 
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  In fact, the percentage of U.S. service personnel who suffered negative 
psychological consequences associated with participation in combat, such as Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), is at one in three according to the most recent 
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs study.118  When adding significant substance 
abuse, anxiety, and severe depression, the percentage rises yet further.  Interestingly, 
though not surprising, those veterans who had participated in more frontline combat 
were disproportionately represented as having significant readjustment issues.119 Why 
were American combat troops not only achieving a high ratio-of-fire, but also 
seemingly more capable of killing and committing acts of cruelty towards both 
civilians and enemy alike?  What had changed in the production of a combat 
infantryman during Vietnam?      
The Program 
 
It's easier if you catch them young. You can train older men to be soldiers; it's done 
in every major war. But you can never get them to believe that they like it, which is 
the major reason armies try to get their recruits before they are twenty. There are 
other reasons too, of course, like the physical fitness, lack of dependents, and 
economic dispensability of teenagers, that make armies prefer them, but the most 
important qualities teenagers bring to basic training are enthusiasm and naivete. . . 
.The armed forces of every country can take almost any young male civilian and turn 
him into a soldier with all the right reflexes and attitudes in only a few weeks. Their 
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recruits usually have no more than twenty years' experience of the world, most of it as 
children, while the armies have had all of history to practice and perfect their 
technique. 
 
— Gwynne Dyer, War 
 
  To understand why U.S. combat soldiers in Vietnam had such a high ratio of 
fire, as well as why in many instances killing was “easier” for them compared to their 
World War II counterparts, an examination of three core psychological concepts is 
necessary.  Using these three principles during training was the crucial difference 
psychologically between Korea and Vietnam in terms of the capacity of an average 
recruit to kill another human, and in some cases even take pleasure in the act.120  
Specifically, the methods used to ensure this result are desensitization, conditioning, 
and denial defense mechanisms.121  Grossman believes this triad is the deciding 
psychological factor in enhancing combat performance.122  He explains: 
And thus, since World War II, a new era has quietly dawned in 
modern warfare: an era of psychological warfare–psychological 
warfare conducted not upon the enemy, but on one’s own troops.  
Propaganda and various other crude forms of psychological enabling 
have always been present in warfare, but in the second half of this 
century psychology has had an impact as great as that of technology on 
the modern battlefield.123  
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What is the purpose and impact of these methods the founder of killology has placed 
such importance on?  A general overview is adequate for each of the three concepts 
as they relate to killology, and specifically Vietnam.  However, much more can be 
said about the role each method plays in preparing recruits for battle.  
 Desensitization during military training is not a new phenomenon.  Humans 
have always used mechanisms to define their enemies as different.  For instance, 
primitive tribes have frequently taken names that when translated mean “man” or 
“human”, by definition making non-members less than human or “others.”124  
Another obvious example is the names U.S. combatants have used for their enemies 
over the decades: Huns, Krauts, Japs, gooks, slopes, dinks, Commies, and so on.125  
Dyer bolsters this assertion by writing: 
      Most of the language used in Parris Island to describe the joys of 
killing people is bloodthirsty but meaningless hyperbole, and the 
recruits realize that even as they enjoy it.  Nevertheless, it does help to 
desensitize them to the suffering of an “enemy,” and at the same time 
they are being indoctrinated in the most explicit fashion (as previous 
generations were not) with the notion that their purpose is not just to 
be brave or to fight well; it is to kill people.126 
 
Authors such as Dyer, Grossman, and Holmes have studied the celebration of killing 
in training, and have largely determined that bloodthirsty rhetoric aimed at 
desensitizing recruits was virtually unheard of in World War I, rare during World 
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War II, more prevalent by Korea, and pervasive in Vietnam.127  This was especially 
useful in overcoming the social-cultural indoctrination the average U.S. recruit may 
have regarding the morality of killing.128   
Turse provides a further example of the desensitization process in action when 
he describes the prevailing sentiment of high-ranking commanders to enlisted men 
concerning the Vietnamese people: 
The notion that Vietnam’s inhabitants were something less than human 
was often spoken of as the “mere-gook-rule,” or, in the acronym-mad 
military, the MGR.  This held that all Vietnamese—northern and 
southern, adults and children, armed enemy and innocent civilian—
were little more than animals, who could be abused or killed at will.  
The MGR enabled soldiers to abuse children for amusement; it 
allowed officers sitting in judgement at courts-martial to let off 
murderers with little or no punishment; and it paved the way for 
commanders to willfully ignore rampant abuses by their troops while 
racking up “kills” to win favor at the Pentagon.129  
 
The emotional distance created by labelling the enemy as part of the outside-group 
made maiming or killing them easier.  This dehumanization of the enemy is 
instrumental in not simply training soldiers to be brave, but to also be effective 
killers. 
 In most cases the desensitization process during Vietnam was applied early in 
a young recruit’s career as a soldier.  They are told that killing the enemy is 
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appropriate and good, and that the enemy is not fully human.  Often training videos 
and lectures are full of gory-details that celebrate the mutilation of the enemies 
through claymores or headshots, while the drill instructors praise them for honing 
their aggression.130  Through the use of psychological techniques with varying 
degrees of intensity during training, recruits can be desensitized sufficiently that 
inherent resistance to killing is largely overcome.  As Dyer notes, “In basic training 
establishments, however, the malleability is all one way: in the direction of 
submission to military authority and the internalization of military values.  What a 
place like Parris Island produces when it is successful, as it usually is, is a soldier who 
will kill because that is his job.”131  
 To civilians and military personnel, conditioning is perhaps the most well-
known concept in the triad.  During the Vietnam War, psychological conditioning 
was a staple of basic training, much like today’s U.S. military training programs.  The 
techniques of applied psychology to training were built upon lessons learned in Korea 
as well as upon the copious amounts of psychological research further examining 
Skinner’s findings on operant conditioning.132  Soldiers were trained to react to 
external stimuli without thinking.133  During marksmanship courses in World War II, 
recruits often took prescribed positions, such as a prone firing posture, while calmly 
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shooting at stationary bullseye-targets.  A similar course during Vietnam had recruits 
standing in foxholes while wearing a full load of battle gear.  The recruits then waited 
anxiously for a moving target to pop up at random, which allows the recruit only a 
few moments to squeeze off a couple of rounds.  If the recruit’s aim was true, a 
satisfying sound from the bullet’s impact is heard, followed by the human-like target 
collapsing backwards, just as a real human might.  As Grossman points out, “The 
method used to train today’s – and the Vietnam era’s – U.S. Army and USMC 
soldiers is nothing more than an application of conditioning techniques to develop a 
reflexive “quick shoot” ability.“134  
 Though marksmanship is being learned in this type of training, the recruit is 
also learning the ability to shoot reflexively as well.  Instantaneous action and 
precision are taught, but more importantly the recruit is mimicking the precise action 
of killing on a modern battlefield.  The human-shaped moving targets appearing in 
the field of fire is the “conditioned stimulus,” the immediate engagement of the target 
by the recruit is “target behavior,” and a successful hit is rewarded by immediate 
feedback (the sound or collapsing of the target).135  This “positive reinforcement” can 
also take the form of a token economy where badges, ribbons, medals, and weekend 
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passes may be rewards for aggressively and accurately engaging the enemy (target), 
or the recruit may receive praise, public recognition, or similar rewards.136    
The effort to make combat scenarios even more visceral has resulted in 
ingenious devices that mimic killing.  Uniforms filled with balloons that float across 
the field and collapse once hit, jugs filled with red paint that explode on impact, raw 
meat strewn about exercise courses, and oranges taped to sparring-dummies to 
replicate the sensation of gouging eyes out, are only a few examples of many.  Carlos 
Hathcock, perhaps the most famous U.S. sniper in Vietnam with over 93 confirmed 
kills, used conditioning techniques in training other snipers.  Instead of using a 
standard target during sniper practice, Hathcock taped a life-size picture of a man’s 
face to the target and told his recruits to “Put three rounds inside the inside corner of 
the right eye of the bad guy.”137  Certainly, realism, reaction, and repetition have a 
significant impact on the psychology of a recruit, and during training conditioned 
responses to certain situations were ingrained into the soldier’s minds. How to 
immediately react during an ambush is but one example.  Though recruits often 
scoffed at simplistic pre-determined reactions, when in the field, often these 
conditioned responses saved the soldiers life.138 
Fort Polk, the “Home of the Infantry Soldier,” provides a good example of 
realistic training combat infantry training during Vietnam.  An infantry recruit spent 
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eight weeks in basic training where they learned the fundamentals of marching, the 
manual of arms, physical training, military customs, ranks, and procedures.  After the 
initial eight weeks, recruits were then sent on to another eight weeks of occupational 
training.  To assist in this, by 1963 the U.S. Army began using drill instructors and 
committees to further enhance training.  Drill instructors, experienced soldiers who 
had proven accomplishments in the field, acted as mentors to the recruits, teaching 
them what they could expect in battle.139  Committees, or specialty instructors, would 
train recruits in the specifics of infiltration, basic rifle marksmanship, night fighting, 
close combat, and other general subjects such as first aid.  Advanced Infantry 
Training (AIT) had already been incorporated into U.S. combat training programs by 
the end of the Korean War as a subsequent eight-week training course. After the 
initial eight weeks at Fort Polk, it meant training at Tiger Land and Tiger Ridge.  
Tiger Ridge was the location of a mock Vietnamese thatched-hut village, complete 
with livestock and villagers (NCOs in costume).  The recruits participated in 
simulated patrols, search and destroy missions, confiscations, and intelligence 
gathering that used Tiger Ridge as a realistic setting for what they could expect in 
Vietnam.140      
The world’s best armies understand the importance of realistic training, and 
modern infantry commanders generally understand the importance of immediate 
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feedback for recruits, yet Grossman does not feel the drill instructors or leaders 
necessarily understand “why” these training techniques are working and certainly not 
what any long-term psychological consequences might be.  He observed that many in 
the U.S. military concerned with combat training do not care for the specifics of 
conditioning, only that the methods used simply work.141  Fundamentally, what 
allows this type of training process to work is the same as what caused Pavlov’s dogs 
to salivate at the sound of a bell, or Skinner’s rats to press a lever.  Grossman believes 
that the military has tapped into “The single most powerful and reliable behavior 
modification process yet discovered by the field of psychology, and now applied to 
the field of warfare: operant conditioning.”142 
Denial defense mechanisms are the last component of Grossman’s 
conditioning-process triad.  A rough definition of denial and defense mechanisms is 
that they are unconscious methods for dealing with traumatic experiences.143  A 
simplified example can be observed in a soldier’s ability to disassociate with enemies 
he has killed as something other than humans.  Through careful repetition of the 
killing process, a soldier is able to deny that he actually has killed another human 
being, even if only suspending that belief temporarily.  Rather, because of constantly 
and carefully mimicking the act of killing, such as by shooting at E-type (man-shaped 
target), the soldier is able to convince himself he has merely engaged a target.  This 
                                                 
141 Ibid,. 255. 
142 Ibid,.  
143 S. A. McLeod, “Defense Mechanisms,” Simply Psychology, last modified 2015, 
www.simplypsychology.org/operant-conditioning.html, accessed August 7, 2016. 
81 
 
subconsciously manufactured deniability when combined with conditioning is critical 
in overcoming the disinclination to kill.144 
 To further illustrate denial defense mechanisms Grossman presents 
statements from an interview with Bill Jordan a law-enforcement expert and veteran 
of numerous gunfights.  Jordan combines desensitization with denial defense when 
advising new law-enforcement officers: 
[There is] a natural disinclination to pull the trigger . . . when your 
weapon is pointed at a human. Even though their own life was at stake, 
most officers report having this trouble in their first fight.  To aid in 
overcoming this resistance it is helpful if you can will yourself to think 
of your opponent as a mere target and not as a human being. In this 
connection you should go further and pick a spot on the target. This 
will allow better concentration and further remove the human element 
from your thinking. If this works for you, try to continue this thought 
in allowing yourself no remorse.  A man who will resist an officer with 
weapons has no respect for the rules by which decent people are 
governed. He is an outlaw who has no place in world society. His 
removal is completely justified, and should be accomplished 
dispassionately and without regret.145 
 
Jordan is describing some key psychological concepts directly related to the triad, and 
ultimately killology.  First, he describes this thinking as manufactured contempt, and 
as Grossman points out, “the combination of denial of, and contempt for, the victim’s 
role in society (desensitization), along with the psychological denial of, and contempt 
for, the victim’s humanity (developing a denial defense mechanism), is a mental 
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process that is tied in and reinforced every time the officer fires a round at the 
target.”146  
  The combination of desensitization, operant conditioning and denial defense 
mechanisms created a potent elixir of combat psychology through which it is clear, 
soldiers in Vietnam were able to psychologically overcome most resistances to 
killing.  The kill ratio throughout the war, driven by a desire for body counts, is 
evidence of a willingness to kill unleashed, even if considering the lowest reliable 
averages.  It is important to remember that ultimately only a small number of men 
saw direct combat, and even fewer actually killed.  It is likely that less than 30% of 
those who served in Vietnam saw combat of any sort, and engagements were often 
short, intense affairs where U.S. soldiers attempted to maximize casualties before the 
enemy withdrew147.  However, improved training (especially, psychological 
conditioning), technology, and tactics, meant that soldiers during Vietnam that made 
direct contact with the enemy tended to fire their weapons, and had less inhibition 
about killing than previous generations of U.S. soldiers.148  
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Results 
 
There are three kinds of people who kill, from what I can discern in combat.  For 
some people, that first kill makes them almost sick. Physically ill. They really can't 
deal with it.  At the other extreme, there are those people who get that rush. It's the 
supreme power act. It almost gives them a god complex. Some guys, when they do it, 
they like it. They get hooked on killing just like they got hooked on heroin, and they 
figure out a way to spend the rest of their life doing it. They may stay in the military 
and become lifers. They may get out and become professional killers. Or they may 
become killers for hire. But they got that rush, and it's addictive.  In the middle, there 
are guys who get that rush but fight with the moral conflict. When you're raised all 
your life in the church, you go to Sunday school, you learn the Ten Commandments, 
and 'Thou Shall Not Kill' is drilled into you. Then you're in the military, where your 
job is now to kill. 
 
—Washington Booker III, USMC Sniper 
 
 The training programs implemented by the U.S. military in the 1950s and 
1960s were undoubtedly effective at preparing soldiers to enter into combat and kill.  
Kill ratios, even when revised down for inflated body counts, remain at roughly a 
three-to-two ratio of enemy combat deaths to U.S. and allied combat deaths 
(including ARVN), and is evidence of the efficacy of modern technology, tactics, and 
training in the U.S. military.149  The effectiveness of conditioning when applied 
through modern training techniques is evident in testimony from the soldiers 
themselves, such as when Lonny finally declared during his video interview, “I 
blasted ‘em. Silhouettes.  They’re not real people, there are just targets!”  When a 
                                                 
149 Charles Hirschman, Samuel Preston, and Vu Manh Loi, "Vietnamese Casualties During the 
American War: A New Estimate," Population and Development Review 21, no. 4 (1995) : 789-90. 
84 
 
U.S. colonel explained to Grossman his experience with killing in Vietnam, he said in 
certain terms, “Two shots.  Bam-Bam.  Just like we had been trained in ‘quick kill.’ 
When I killed, I did it just like that.  Just like I’d been trained.  Without even 
thinking.”150  Other Vietnam veterans have described the killing sequence as 
automatic or programmed—the result of modern training techniques.  Further 
examples of the efficacy of psychological conditioning can be found in the lopsided 
kill ratios between the British and Argentinian rifleman during the Falklands War, or 
between U.S. and Panamanian forces during the 1989 invasion of Panama.151  In both 
instances, the superior training of infantrymen conditioned through modern 
techniques prevailed.  A more recent example of superior combat infantry training is 
available when looking at the Battle of Mogadishu in October, 1993.  Elite U.S. 
troops during Operation Gothic Serpent were ambushed in the capital of Somalia 
while trying to apprehend the criminal warlord Mohammed Aidid, which resulted in a 
prolonged close-combat battle.  No artillery strikes, air strikes, armor, or heavy 
weapons were available, rather it was a close-combat infantry duel.  The poorly 
trained and equipped Somali fighters were soundly defeated by the U.S. forces, losing 
approximately 364, while the Americans suffered 18 KIA.152  
 The success of conditioning, desensitization, and denial defense mechanisms 
is clear: All other things being equal, when U.S. troops engage enemies that have not 
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been subject to similar modern combat training, the result is victory.  However, the 
increased ratio of fire and disabling of psychological safeguards against killing 
ostensibly comes with a hidden cost.153  Turse might point to evidence of atrocities 
committed against Vietnamese civilians as evidence of the danger associated with 
removing mental constraints against killing. Grossman also warns about this 
specifically: 
  During the Vietnam era millions of American adolescents were 
conditioned to engage in an act against which they had a powerful 
resistance. This conditioning is a necessary part of allowing a soldier 
to succeed and survive in the environment where society has placed 
him. If we accept that we need an army, then we must accept that it 
has to be as capable of surviving as we can make it.  But if society 
prepares a soldier to overcome his resistance to killing and places him 
in an environment in which he will kill, then that society has an 
obligation to deal forthrightly, intelligently, and morally with the 
psychological repercussions upon the soldier and the society. Largely 
through an ignorance of the processes and implications involved, this 
did not happen for Vietnam veterans—a mistake we risk making again 
as the war in Iraq becomes increasingly deadly and unpopular.154 
 
With this in mind, there are two distinct lessons that can be drawn from killology 
regarding Vietnam.  First, the psychological triad of modern combat training works.  
Second, there is a significant risk of psychological damage to recruits who are subject 
to modern combat training techniques.  Grossman continues: 
The ability to increase the firing rate, though, comes with a hidden 
cost. Severe psychological trauma becomes a distinct possibility when 
military training overrides safeguards against killing: In a war when 95 
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percent of soldiers fired their weapons at the enemy, it should come as 
no surprise that between 18 and 54 percent of the 2.8 million military 
personnel who served in Vietnam suffer from post-traumatic stress 
disorder—far higher than in previous wars.155 
 
Historian Richard Gabriel asserts that Vietnam produced more psychiatric casualties 
than any other war in U.S. history, pointing out, “The result was that at least 500,000 
— perhaps as many as 1,500,000 — returning Viet Nam veterans suffered some 
degree of psychiatric debilitation, called Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, an illness 
which has become associated in the public mind with an entire generation of soldiers 
sent to war in Vietnam.”156 
As dire a warning as Gabriel, Grossman, and others sharing their beliefs have 
given regarding the potential for psychological damage, it was virtually inevitable 
that the U.S. military continued to use and improve upon psychological conditioning 
for enhancing combat performance.  Though the U.S. military is now more aware of 
the potential consequences of conditioning, especially with veterans who have seen 
combat, it remains to be seen if re-sensitization methods will be effective in dealing 
with PTSD and other consequences of combat.   Veterans of Operation Desert Storm 
and the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of the global war on terror were 
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and are trained using the same psychological-triad principles as recruits during the 
Vietnam War, though the methods employed have simply become more advanced.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four 
 
 
 Modern Combat: Infinite Possibilities 
 
Now it was a matter of waiting for Bravo Company's soldiers to arrive on the scene, 
and here they came, in Humvees and on foot, swarming across a thoroughly ruined 
landscape. The battlefield was theirs now, from the main pile of bodies, to the trash 
pile with Noor-Eldeen, to the shot-up houses and buildings, to the van--inside of 
which, among the bodies, they discovered someone alive. 
 
—David Finkel, The Good Soldiers 
 
 
At a White House press briefing in April, 2010, seated in the front of the room 
with a score of journalists, CNN reporter Jake Tapper calmly raised his hand.  When 
called upon by White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, Tapper asked about 
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events surrounding an incident that had occurred in a suburb of Baghdad on July 12, 
2007.  The incident in question involved the death of a dozen Iraqi civilians, 
including two Reuters war correspondents, Saeed Chmagh and Namir Noor-Eldeen, 
and two children.  The U.S. military claimed they did not know what happened and 
repeatedly denied requests from Reuters for information about the engagement. The 
truth about the incident might have remained buried, as had happened with other 
incidents in Iraq in which U.S. combatants with only a murky understanding of the 
Rules of Engagement (ROE) targeted civilians in error.157  However, Bradley 
Manning, the U. S. Army intelligence analyst turned whistleblower, revealed the full 
horror of the incident to the world.158   
Among the classified documents released by Manning to WikiLeaks before 
his arrest was audio-video footage from a pair of AH-64 Apache helicopters 
responsible for the death of the two Reuters journalists.  The graphic nature of the 
night vision video shocked the American public as it made news headlines across the 
world.  Much of the outrage pointed at the U.S. military was based on the poor ROE 
protocol that allowed the pilots, ground teams, and commanders to misidentify the 
civilians as enemy combatants, though there is still some dispute over whether the 
group had been completely unarmed.  While the failure to properly identify targets 
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before engaging is disturbing, it is not an uncommon occurrence in warfare.  Mistakes 
happen, and innocents pay the price.  Beyond the graphic images, what appalled 
many in the United States and across the world was the audio recording of the 
massacre, which provided a brief glimpse into the cruel reality of killing in modern 
war.159  
The electronic image intensification sensors on the Apaches showed a cluster 
of civilians in the middle of a road, ostensibly conversing and smoking cigarettes. 
The black and white imaging of the weapon sensors added a sense of dread to the 
video as it unfolded.  “Just fuckin’ once you get on ‘em, just open ‘em up,” the lead 
Apache pilot excitedly blurted out.  “All right,” the gunner meekly replied.  “You’re 
clear!” the pilot shouted, his excitement evident in his voice.  At this point the video 
showed the electronic crosshairs of a 30mm cannon locked onto the group of men 
conversing in the street.160   
Though the imagery the weapon-systems operator saw was detailed, there was 
just enough digitization to add a surreal quality to the video; the humans about to die 
might have been characters in a video game.  “All right, firing,” the gunner 
announced enthusiastically.  A muted popping sound could be heard as the 30mm 
cannons fired in an extended burst.  A few seconds later, the group of men who had 
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been conversing seemed to explode in a ball of dust as the rounds impacted.  “Keep 
shooting. Keep shooting.  Keep shoot. Keep shoot.” the pilot screamed as he urged on 
his gunner in words similar to the mantras that appeared in Army and United States 
Marine Corps training programs during the Vietnam War.161   
A horrific scene emerged as the dust cleared from the initial strike.  The 
carnage wrought by the 30mm cannon left most of the men torn apart, with a few 
severely wounded and still writhing in agony on the street. “All right, we just engaged 
all eight individuals,” the pilot reported to the ground forces near the scene.  “Oops, 
I’m sorry, what was going on?” the gunner sardonically states.  “God damn it Kyle” 
the pilot shouted jokingly, making a reference to a character’s signature phrase from a 
popular cartoon called South Park.  The gunner laughed, “All right, I hit ‘em.  I’m 
just trying to find targets again.”162  
The dismounted infantry and the Apache pilots were not certain of the 
presence of weapons among the civilians, though they claimed numerous AK-47 
rifles and rocket propelled grenades were present.  The escalation from identification 
to engagement took two minutes.  After the killing the military claimed weapons were 
found among the civilians and were present in the videos.  Further examination of the 
video after its release showed what might have been a few rifles among the civilians.  
However, what initially alerted Bushmaster-Six (the dismounted infantry) was the tri-
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pod and video equipment carried by Saeed Chmagh and Namir Noor-Eldeen.  
Terribly wounded, Chmagh is then seen crawling away from the site of impact for 
roughly a minute before a van pulls up to him and stops.  The van belonged to Saleh 
Mutashar, who had been driving his children Sajad and Doaha to their uncle’s home 
before coming across Chmagh.  In the video, Saleh can be seen rushing to Chmagh’s 
aid in an effort to drag him into his vehicle before being killed alongside him a few 
moments later.  The van was also targeted by the lead Apache and riddled with 30mm 
shells.163  
Individuals familiar with the principles of killology were likely aghast at the 
graphic carnage wrought by the 30mm cannons, yet underlying this was something 
perhaps more unsettling.  An observant student of combat psychology might have 
noticed that the exchange between the Apache crew members exhibited some key 
elements of killology being applied on the modern battlefield.  Specifically, one 
might observe that psychological conditions were created that facilitated the attack 
and allowed the crew to kill in such a seemingly callous or even joyful manner. To 
highlight these principles at work, a simple deconstruction of the sequence of events 
can be done.  
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The Apache weapons system was effectively an aerial crew-serviced weapon.  
The weapons systems on board the helicopters are designed with ground support in 
mind, and if the main weapons are not firing, the Apache is nothing more than a 
hovering, multimillion dollar target.  The armaments of attack vehicles have trended 
towards replacing the less mobile crew-serviced weapons of the past.  In World War 
II, a competent heavy machine-gun crew could inflict devastating casualties, but it 
was limited by a relative lack of mobility.  Armored personnel carriers, Bradley 
fighting vehicles, and a wide array of attack helicopters fulfill the same role while 
providing superior firepower and mobility.  The Apache guns were expected to fire 
because Bushmaster-Six depended on this tactical asset as another facet of U.S. 
combined arms doctrine.164 
Expectations were also present in the form of sociological and psychological 
influences.  S.L.A. Marshall, David Hackworth, and other professional soldiers have 
observed that the desire to avoid failing one’s comrades is what motivates most 
soldiers to fight. Psychologists and sociologists have determined that humans in many 
instances want to be valued as a useful member of their in-group.  To satisfy this 
need, soldiers are pressured to perform their duty under the watchful eye of their 
fellow soldiers.  Both the Apache pilot encouraging his gunner to fire and the 
dismounted infantry were depending on his taking action.  Not wanting to fail his 
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comrades and peer pressure helped facilitate the gunner’s capacity to pull the trigger 
of his weapon.  He subsequently rose to the challenge and met expectations.165 
Proximity was a deciding factor for two reasons.  First, the pilot of the Apache 
(the ranking crewman) was situated physically near the gunner. Sociologists, 
psychologists, and the U.S. military have determined that such an arrangement 
reinforces authority, an important component that enables killing.166  Sitting behind 
and slightly elevated to the gunner, one can imagine the feeling of being under such 
close physical observation while being yelled at to shoot.   Physical proximity to the 
target also played a key role during this attack.  As Dave Grossman and others have 
suggested, it is easier to kill at significant range because the target is less discernable, 
and therefore less human.167  Because the Apache crew was physically distant from 
the targets, they were mostly insulated from the worst sensory aspects of the carnage. 
The smells, sounds, and gore were not present, making the killing process easier. 
Eerily glowing white against the darkened urban backdrop, the humans were 
merely silhouettes when portrayed through the modern weapons sensors designed by 
Lockheed Martin.168  Just as many Vietnam combat veterans were conditioned 
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through training to view the enemy as nothing more than silhouette targets, the 
gunner of the Apache had technological assistance to achieve this same effect.  The 
gunner viewed the targets through the additional medium of computerized imagery, 
making makes killing easier still.  The electronic “filter” between the gunner and his 
targets provided psychological “cover” that enabled him to more easily disassociate 
his victims from flesh-and-blood humans, since he saw them as digital proxies from 
the controlled environment of a helicopter cockpit.  The effect was a technological 
version of dehumanization.  A similar situation occurs during an execution when a 
hood is placed over the target’s head.  This simultaneously spares the executioners the 
emotional trauma caused by seeing the victim’s face, making it easier to kill the 
nondescript individual who is now seemingly less human.169  U.S. soldiers during 
both Gulf Wars and in Afghanistan also used racialized terms for their opponents, just 
as they had in previous wars.  This created a further emotional distance from the 
enemy.  Terms such as “raghead” or “hajji” replaced “gook” and “kraut” in the 
language of U.S. soldiers and their Western allies during the Gulf Wars and in 
Afghanistan as a method to make them part of the out-group and therefore easier to 
kill.  The digitized medium of weapon sensors achieved a similar effect.170  
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 Unfortunately for the infantry first on the scene after the attack, the tragedy 
could not have been more real.  Inside the wreckage of Saleh’s van, both his children 
were severely injured.  Ethan McCord was the first infantryman to notice the injured 
children, acted swiftly in removing them from the van.  McCord carried their broken 
bodies one by one to a nearby Bradley fighting vehicle for medical attention, despite 
being yelled at by an NCO to secure the perimeter.  After learning about the injured 
children, the crew of the Apache responsible responded with “Ah damn. Oh well." 
followed by, "Well, it's their fault for bringing kids into a battle."171  The chilling 
response to the tragedy only fueled the social and political condemnation faced by the 
U.S. Army and the White House.  Manning was arrested, convicted, and is currently 
serving time at the Marine Corps Brig in Quantico, Virginia for his role in the leak, 
but none of the Apache pilots or ground forces involved faced disciplinary charges of 
any kind.  The U.S. Army did release two reports on the incident, but ultimately 
decided not to reopen the investigation, despite criticism from some in the media and 
government.172   
After that day, McCord claimed he became traumatized by the scene, stating, 
"The first thing I thought of ...was my children at home."173  He asked for medical 
treatment for his psychological trauma, but instead was ridiculed by his NCO.  He 
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suffered from severe post-traumatic stress as a result and is currently on a long road 
to recovery.  This was perhaps the final principle of killology to be observed from the 
July 12 incident.  Though the carnage wrought seemed to have minimal impact on the 
Apache pilots, the aftermath of the slaughter significantly impacted those who had a 
front row seat to the horror.  Without mitigating factors such as increased physical 
proximity and digitally enhanced dehumanization, even those not directly responsible 
for the act of killing faced potential mental and emotional consequences as 
witnesses.174   
Killology and the Modern U.S. Army   
 
Warrior Ethos refers to the professional attitudes and beliefs that will 
characterize you. Developed through discipline, commitment to Army Values and 
knowledge of the Army’s proud heritage, Warrior Ethos notes military service as 
much more than just a “job” — it is a profession with the enduring purpose to win 
wars and destroy our nation’s enemies. 
 
—FM 3-21.8, The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad 
 
 The Apache attack on July 12, 2007 would have looked completely different 
only decade earlier.  The fire control system, armaments, and electronics suite would 
have been inferior on all points, as was proven by a government field test in which a 
small group of modern prototypes (AH-64D) handily defeated a numerically superior 
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force of the older models (AH-64A).175  The imbalance in combat power between the 
helicopter variants was the result of advances in emergent technology during the 
Information Age.  Starting in the 1990s, the blossoming of advanced computer 
technology meant that military vehicles such as the modern Apache variants could 
carry a more sophisticated targeting system, more intuitive electronics, and a more 
powerful damage control system.  The computer and a myriad of other technologies 
have irrevocably changed the nature of combat and redefined modern warfare. This 
chapter defines modern warfare as the period from 1990 to present and primarily 
examines the backbone of America’s ground forces, the U.S. Army.   
Since the end of the Vietnam War, the integration of killology principles into 
modern combat training programs has been an organic process more than a deliberate 
one.  It is likely that Grossman himself would be hard pressed to identify any one 
significant act that had the effect of revolutionizing the U.S. military’s ability to train 
violence-averse soldiers to kill.  This same process occurred after World War II when 
the U.S. Army began restructuring units, providing better equipment, better training 
programs, and better instruction.  This multifaceted approach took twenty years but 
ultimately resulted in a 90% ratio of fire by U.S. soldiers in combat during the 
Vietnam War.176  Since the 1970s, this type of organic process has continued to 
reshape and refine the U.S. military into its current form, albeit with some notable 
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exceptions.  For example, the formal establishment of an all-volunteer military in 
1973 marked a significant development towards enhancing combat effectiveness, 
because volunteers almost uniformly perform better in combat than conscripts.177,178  
The move to an all-volunteer force also meant that personnel could not be wasted on 
menial tasks like peeling potatoes, like it had been during the elevated troop levels 
during the era of the draft.  Instead civilian contactors were beginning to be used to 
fill the more menial roles, a situation that is even more prevalent today.179  The U.S. 
Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was also formed during this 
period in an effort to redefine the Army’s mission, improve organization, and as a 
proactive means of creating better methods of instruction.  TRADOC also lead the 
development of the Army’s new doctrine known as AirLand Battle, a concept that 
focused on combined arms maneuver warfare and flexibility in order to meet the 
shifting political challenges of the Cold War and beyond.180 
Though not as flashy as a new doctrine like AirLand Battle, the field manuals 
produced by TRADOC since 1973 leave a trail of clues about the adaptive nature of 
the U.S. Army and a willingness to embrace new ideas.  These new field manuals 
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illustrate small changes that have been made over time in response to shifting 
battlefield conditions, and they appear to be tied to some concepts presented in 
killology.  Seemingly minor changes to the manuals over the last few decades provide 
some evidence of the adaptive and organic nature of military tactical planning, 
specifically when examining the infantry. 
   Field Manuel 7-8 (FM 7-8), The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad Leader, 
jokingly referred to as “the Bible” by infantrymen, was approved and released by the 
Department of the Army in 1992.  Section 1 is titled “Mission” and describes the 
basic role of combat infantry:    
The mission of the infantry is to close with the enemy by means of fire 
and maneuver to defeat or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, 
close combat, and counterattack. . . .  Despite any technological 
advantages that our armed forces might have over an enemy, only 
close combat between ground forces gains the decision in battle. 
Infantry rifle forces (infantry, airborne, air assault, light, and ranger) 
have a key role in close combat situations.181 
 
In 2007, TRADOC issued a significantly revised version of FM 7-8 titled FM 
3-21.8.  FM 3-21.8 was a response to the rapidly changing technological and 
battlefield conditions U.S. soldiers faced in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and it 
was grounded in lessons learned during the early stages of the wars in Afghanistan 
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and Iraq. Some interesting changes pertaining to the role of the individual soldier are 
immediately noticeable:   
The Infantry’s primary role is close combat, which may occur in any 
type of mission, in any theater, or environment. Characterized by 
extreme violence and physiological shock, close combat is callous and 
unforgiving. Its dimensions are measured in minutes and meters, and 
its consequences are final. Close combat stresses every aspect of the 
physical, mental, and spiritual features of the human dimension. . . . 
Infantry are particularly susceptible to the harsh conditions of combat, 
the effects of direct and indirect fire, the physical environment, and 
moral factors. 182 
 
The description of the infantry mission in FM 3-2.8 specifically acknowledges that 
soldiers will be faced with situations that are filled with “extreme violence,” and 
“physiological shock.”  Close combat is described as “callous and unforgiving.”  The 
last sentence in particular indicates that U.S. Army tactical planners had embraced the 
most fundamental concept of killology: humans, especially infantry, are extremely 
susceptible to the horrors of combat.  There is no mention of what conditions a soldier 
will likely face in combat in the equivalent section of FM 7-8.  Though hardly 
conclusive, seemingly insignificant changes in how the U.S. Army perceives the 
rigors of battle are noteworthy. 
 The U.S. Army showed that it had begun to integrate more sophisticated 
elements of combat psychology into its modern instruction as well.  Realism has been 
a major component in effective training during and since the Vietnam War, as Fort 
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Polk’s Tiger Land and Tiger Ridge infantry training courses demonstrated.  Realistic 
training was more effective.183  FM 25-100, entitled Training the Force, was issued in 
1988, and it contained instructions that definitively stated that realism in training was 
essential to good combat performance.  This is clearly seen a section entitled, “Train 
as You Fight”: 
The goal of combat-level training is to achieve combat-level standards. 
Every effort must be made to attain this difficult goal.  Within the 
confines of safety and common sense, leaders must be willing to 
accept less than perfect results initially and demand realism in training. 
They must integrate such realistic conditions as smoke, noise, 
simulated NBC, battlefield debris, loss of key leaders, and cold 
weather.184 
 
FM 25-100 undoubtedly encouraged the use of realism in combat training and 
changed the way the Army trained.  Smoke, noise, debris, command 
disruption, and the weather were all recommended props that helped achieve a 
high level of combat simulation. The same principal in killology that 
suggested human silhouette pop-up targets are superior for training to that of 
unrealistic bulls-eye targets.185,186   
                                                 
183 Rickey Robertson, “Vietnam War Training at Tiger Ridge,” last modified March, 2013.  
http://www.sfasu.edu/heritagecenter/7068.asp, (see discussion in Chapter Three). 
184 U.S. Department of the Army, FM100-25: Training the Force (Washington D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1988), 3. 
185 Dave Grossman and Loren W. Christianson, On Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly 
Conflict in War and in Peace (Millstadt: Warrior Science Publications, 2008), 22-33. 
186 Eric K. Shinseki, introduction to FM 7-0: Training for Full Spectrum Operations (Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2008), i. 
102 
 
In 2008, FM 7-0 Training for Full Spectrum Operations was released 
as an update of the aging FM 25-100.  FM 7-0 was the U.S. Army’s 
standardized training doctrine, and was applicable throughout the force until 
2016.  It provided authoritative foundations for individual, leadership, and 
unit training, and contained language familiar to students of combat 
psychology.  In section 2-32, entitled “Make Training Performance Oriented, 
Realistic, and Mission Focused,” not only does the manual recommend 
realism, but it encouraged the use of physical and psychological props or 
“enablers” during training to create as authentic an experience as possible: 
Effective training incorporates conditions that allow execution of both 
core capability and general mission-essential tasks using lethal and 
nonlethal actions to adapt to different situations. . . . As operational 
environments become more complex and resources (such as time, 
money, land, and airspace) become scarcer, the value of live, virtual, 
constructive, and gaming training enablers increases. These enablers 
enhance training effectiveness by replicating the conditions of an 
actual operational environment. Leaders are responsible for integrating 
and effectively using training aids, devices, simulators, and 
simulations (TADSS) to enhance realism.187  
  
Clearly the U.S. Army had embraced some key concepts of combat 
psychology as shown in the training literature and field manuals.  The most 
recent edition of FM 7-0, entitled Train to Win in a Complex World, released 
in 2016, builds upon the foundations of the training methods prescribed in the 
2008 edition.  In addition, it more fully integrates digital training methods into 
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the normal training regimen, stating, “Commanders leverage available 
resources, to include the mix of live, virtual, and constructive (LVC) training 
enablers.”188  The use of technology throughout the FM 7-0 is emphasized 
much more than in previous versions and it frequently references many 
available programs that make substantial use of digital, laser, satellite, and 
computer systems.  Still, the question of what might have encouraged this 
shift towards a more comprehensive understanding of combat must be 
addressed.  What influenced the change in combat theory and training? 
By 2007, David Grossman’s On Killing: The Psychological Cost of 
Learning to Kill in War and Society had become an accepted part of modern 
military combat training.  Cadets at West Point were required to read 
Grossman’s work, and it was also selected by the Commandant of the Marine 
Corps as mandatory reading for Marines.  It is likely that Grossman’s effort 
towards understanding killing played a significant role in the creation of FM 
3-21.8, if only for the amount of attention he brought to the matter.  Of course, 
Grossman alone is not responsible for the shifting theories on killing in 
combat, but his ideas were specifically utilized and taught at various levels of 
the U.S. military.   
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A 2007 interview with the commanders of the Observer Trainer 
Mentor (OTM) Leadership Training Program demonstrates the significance 
combat veterans placed on killology in preparing untested soldiers for battle.  
The OTM was designed to to teach leaders how to think, not what to think.  In 
2006, over 2,600 officers and NCOs passed through the program, which is 
taught by both combat veterans and soldiers who have not seen combat.  A 
course on killology is taught on the first morning of OTM, but this one is 
always taught  by a veteran with a combat patch.  This is the only course in 
this training program with such a requirement.  An interview with the ranking 
officer and NCO was conducted by the Combat Studies Institute as part of a 
report on the GWOT.  Both Lieutenant Colonel Chuck Olsen, and First 
Sergeant David Atkins speak highly of the killology course: 
The killology class is to get everybody in the right mindset. I talk 
about what happened to me during the Iron Claw mission, and I can 
tell you that as you’re preparing for the mission and as you go out of 
the wire, shit happens. Your adrenaline goes up and down. When 
you’re over there and go through a mission and you lose a buddy or 
somebody in the squad, there are a lot of assets for the soldiers to tap 
into to get help, but there’s still something missing. Sometimes you 
can’t get the right answers from the stress management group or from 
the chaplains group that comes down and works with the unit. I lost 
soldiers when I was in theater and I never had anything like this, so 
when it happened to me there were so many other things happening, 
everything was pretty crazy, and all my guys were going through these 
different phases. I knew why it happened but I never really understood 
why.189 
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The OTM also included a program known as Operation Warrior Trainer for mobilized 
National Guard members who come back from theater and who continued to train 
other soldiers deploying to theater.  The “Warriors” were the seasoned combat 
veterans providing instruction.  Notably, the term “warrior” started becoming more 
prevalent in the Army’s training and recruitment literature.  Grossman briefly 
discussed the warrior’s frame of mind in On Killing, and it was a prominent theme in 
his 2008 publication On Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly Conflict 
in War and in Peace. Grossman believes that a protector-archtype is the preferable 
role of fighting men who are sworn to defend their people and their state.190  The 
warrior ethos is an important part of psychologically preparing people for the both 
trials of combat and its aftermath. 191   
Not long after the publication of On Killing, the warrior ethos became a 
central component of the modern Army’s training program.  A section added to FM 
3-21.8 that had not been included in FM 7-8 was entitled “Warrior Ethos and Army 
Values.” It stressed the importance of professionalism, defining the soldier’s role as 
something more elevated than a mere job.  Instead, being a soldier in the U.S. Army 
was more of a calling.  To illustrate this new concept, the Soldier’s Creed was 
included as an outline of core Army beliefs:  
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I am an American Soldier.  I am a warrior and a member of a team.  I 
serve the people of the United States, and live the Army Values.  I will 
always place the mission first.  I will never accept defeat.  I will never 
quit.  I will never leave a fallen comrade.  I am disciplined, physically 
and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and 
drills. . . . I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life.  I 
am an American Soldier.192 
 
The Soldier’s Creed was approved in 2003, and by the release of FM 3-21.8 was 
already widely used throughout the U.S. Army in training.193  Though the warrior-
archetype is common to many societies throughout history, the crystallization of this 
mindset into formal training material is new.  The observance of key “warrior virtues” 
by the U.S. Army  were fundamental to ingraining concrete ideas of duty and 
sacrifice, both traits that enable killing.  The continued effort to improve combat 
performance meant the U.S. Army was always searching for knowledge that further 
professionalized its modern force, and appeared to have embraced key concepts that 
were developed by military scientists, psychologists, and veterans.  
   The TRADOC archives, the Combined Arms Research Library, and the 
Combat Studies Institute each contain thousands of documents about training and 
combat efficiency.  When viewed chronologically, these field manuals, training 
programs, and other documents provide a trail of clues.  Like any other organization 
that learns as it goes, the U.S. Army is susceptible to the zeitgeist of modern war, 
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which more than ever relies upon science and technology to achieve objectives.  In 
this context, the Army’s interest in the principles outlined in killology is clear.  
Grossman and others like him who share a similar mission to improve human 
understanding of combat and killing have successfully contributed to the Army’s 
development of better training methods.  Unfortunately, there is a psychological price 
paid by the soldiers who endure training techniques that improve lethality.  Modern 
military training is not an unalloyed positive.   
New Frontiers 
 
The aim of the missions was to track, and when the conditions were deemed right, kill 
suspected insurgents. That’s not how they put it, though. They would talk about 
“cutting the grass before it grows out of control”, or “pulling the weeds before they 
overrun the lawn”.  And then there were the children. The airmen would be flying the 
Predators over a village in the tribal areas of Pakistan, say, when a series of smaller 
black shadows would appear across their screens – telling them that kids were at the 
scene.  They called them “fun-sized terrorists.” 
 
—Michael Haas, Drone Operator, U.S. Air Force 
 
 
The 2007 video of the Apache attack was horrific for its visceral quality, yet 
just as chilling to some was the video-game like quality of the weapons systems 
operated by the Apache gunner.  The feeling that the gunner was in a hyper-realistic 
virtual reality game is understandable, because that is exactly how the modern U.S. 
military is training many of its members.  Powerful computers and sophisticated 
electronics are the byproducts of the information age, and military forces around the 
globe benefitted from enhanced technological capabilities.  The U.S. Army and Air 
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Force both moved quickly to upgrade their forces, something that was particularly 
evident in the adoption of virtual training, and drone combat technology.  
Killology stresses both a realistic training environment and the use of 
operant conditioning to promote a reflexive fighting response to external 
threats in soldiers.  Modern combat simulators and other technology-based 
training equipment filled this role well, and the Army encouraged the use of 
these types of resources when possible.  The 2008 publication of FM 7-0 
provides some indication of the future direction of Army combat training.  A 
section on training resources summarizes many methods of more effective 
training that were not available even a decade earlier:  
A combination of live, virtual, constructive, and gaming training 
enablers can help replicate an actual operational environment. Based 
on resources available—such as time, fuel, funds, and training areas—
commanders determine the right mix of live, virtual, constructive, and 
gaming training enablers to effectively and efficiently train for a 
mission or rehearse an operation.194 
 
The U.S. military made good use of combat training centers (CTCs) and other 
facilities in which the latest in simulation technology was included in training.  
The field manuals and training courses reflect a shift towards computer 
enhanced training and VR.  The Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT) is a 
computer based VR program that aids vehicle formations equipped with the 
Reconfigurable Vehicle Simulator (RVS) and Reconfigurable Vehicle 
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Tactical Trainer (RVTT).  These provide realistic vehicle cabs, 
communications equipment, and weapons in a virtual training environment.  
In short, computers and VR are used to replicate an armored infantry column 
one day and a mounted infantry battalion the next.  All of this training 
involves high degree of realism; it also promotes conditioned responses while 
maintaining a high degree of realism and intensity.195    
The type of training offered by VR programs and other computer-
based training modules meets the need for realism in effective combat 
training.  However, a more controversial aspect of combat simulations can be 
found in claims from medical and psychological professionals that using a 
video game environment in psychological conditioning lowers humans’ 
normal resistance to acts of violence.  A twenty-year study conducted by the 
American Psychological Association found that violent video games and 
violent behavior are linked: 
The research demonstrates a consistent relation between violent video 
game use and increases in aggressive behavior, aggressive cognitions 
and aggressive affect, and decreases in prosocial behavior, empathy 
and sensitivity to aggression. . . Scientists have investigated the use of 
violent video games for more than two decades but to date, there is 
very limited research addressing whether violent video games cause 
people to commit acts of criminal violence. . . However, the link 
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between violence in video games and increased aggression in players 
is one of the most studied and best established in the field196   
 
The use of advanced technology in wargame and battle simulators had a direct 
impact on aggression, and as Grossman has argued, facilitated killing.197  In 
an effort to hone skills, the U.S.M.C. adapted a popular first-person shooter 
video game called Doom almost immediately after such software became 
available.  This game allowed trainees to improve reaction time in a realistic 
and changing environment.  The Army followed suit in 2002 when it took the 
extraordinary measure of developing its own video game, called America’s 
Army.198  America’s Army was a success in civilian markets, and various 
applications have been developed by the U.S. Army for specialized training 
using the game as a platform.  Simulation software is used by the U.S. 
military in many aspects of training because the psychological conditions that 
allow an individual to more easily overcome resistance to killing are met by 
elements of VR and video games.199  Yet, perhaps the ultimate example of the 
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intersectionality between video games, psychological conditioning, and 
advanced technology, can be found by examining unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV) programs in the U.S. Air Force, otherwise known as drone 
programs.200,201  
Ultra-modern, incredibly sophisticated, accurate within reason, and 
effective, drones represented a pinnacle of killing technology when viewed in 
the context of combat psychology.  The attraction of drones and robots for 
military scientists is their capacity to destroy targets remotely.  Currently the 
Pentagon has around 7,000 UAVs compared with fewer than 50 a decade 
ago.202  “Ever step on ants and never give it another thought?  That’s what you 
are made to think of the targets – as just black blobs on a screen.  You start to 
do these psychological gymnastics to make it easier to do what you have to do 
– they deserved it, they chose their side.  You had to kill part of your 
conscience to keep doing your job every day – and ignore those voices telling 
you this wasn’t right.”203  This is how Michael Haas, former Air Force drone 
operator described his experience delivering drone payloads onto targets.  
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Haas described other euphemisms for killing in the drone program, such as 
“cutting the grass before it grows out of control,” and “pulling weeds before 
they overrun the lawn.”204  Dehumanizing the enemy is a vital component of 
combat psychology and the drone program encouraged “manufactured 
contempt.”205  The difference between drone operators and ground units 
directly involved in combat is that the drone operators never have to smell, 
see, or hear the results of their handiwork.206  
Grossman calls violent shooter video games “murder simulators” and 
believed them to be a significant factor in conditioning and desensitizing 
humans in order to kill.  The operation of drones is not unlike a video game, 
there is a monitor with a crosshair, the targets are seen through a digital 
medium, and the UAV is controlled with a joystick.  Fundamentally, the 
psychological enablers that allowed the Apache crew to kill with no outward 
signs of remorse are exemplified in drone combat, and most indications point 
toward an even greater use of remote controlled weapon systems that provide 
significant potential to override human resistance to killing.  The increasing 
use of weapons systems that harness the psychological conditions needed to 
make killing easier appear to have solved the problem faced by infantrymen 
throughout history.  It is no longer necessary to thrust a sword into an 
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opponent’s gut or level a musket at a line of soldiers twenty yards away.  
Technological innovation seems to have solved the fundamental problem with 
killing—the human element.  
    Or has it?  The most encouraging news for those concerned about the 
ethical and moral implications of the U.S. military using advanced weapons 
technology coupled with conditioning techniques to create hardened killers 
comes from those presumably most insulated from the visceral reality of war: 
the drone operators themselves.  A study released in 2013 by the Armed 
Forces Health Surveillance Branch found that pilots of drone aircraft 
experience mental health problems like depression, anxiety and post-traumatic 
stress at the same rate as pilots of manned aircraft who are deployed to Iraq or 
Afghanistan.207  The operators were not as insulated from the psychological 
impact of killing as had been thought.  The irony is that despite providing 
ideal psychological conditions, generally people still abhor killing other 
people.     
 What had started with Marshall’s controversial observation that men in 
combat were generally unwilling to fire their weapons at another human being 
prompted a seventy-year investigation by military scientists and psychologists 
into understanding the psychology of killing.  The burgeoning science of 
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killology has carried the flame in this endeavor.  Grossman’s serious attempt 
at explaining the physiological and emotional impact of killing is not a perfect 
one, but it makes strides toward understanding how humans can overcome an 
inherent aversion to killing.  The myriad changes in military doctrine, tactics, 
and training since World War II reveal a serious effort to incorporate many 
concepts put forth in killology in pursuit of creating efficient soldiers.208  
Ironically, for an organization like the U.S. Army that has worked diligently 
towards preparing soldiers to kill, the 2016 release of FM 7-0 Train to Win in 
a Complex World does not mention the word killing once.209  Ultimately, 
science and technology have gone far towards understanding and overcoming 
killing, yet UAVs and Apaches will never win wars on their own.  In the near 
future the role of the ground troops will likely remain unchanged; they will 
still be asked by their country to give their lives as necessity or circumstances 
dictate, just as they will be asked to take lives as their training and conscience 
allows.  The latter of these realities can be most troubling for those who have 
taken life.    
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